




Title of Thesis:        How Social Enterprises Coordinate Cross-Sectoral Solutions for Informal 




Madeleine A. Mozina, Bachelor of Arts, International Studies, 2021 
  
Thesis directed by:        Dr. Greta Uehling 
  
 
As the world continues to urbanize, informal settlements, also referred to as slums, arise to 
help meet an insufficient supply of affordable housing. Informal settlements represent a cross-
sectoral issue that leaves residents vulnerable due to lack of formal property ownership and access 
to public services. Brazil serves as an example where government policies exist that seek to 
regularize informal settlements through legal titling and physical upgrading, yet bureaucratic 
inefficiencies negate the effectiveness of these policies.   
I argue that social enterprises serve as a potential solution through their incentives to form 
partnerships based on a theory of collaborative interdependence. Terra Nova, a for profit legal 
service in Brazil that coordinates large-scale regularization agreements, serves as a case study 
showing how social enterprises are poised to build and manage a partnership ecosystem in a way 
that aggregates benefits for all partners in slum regularization systems. Using a Partnership 
Ecosystem Framework coupled with the theory of collaborative interdependence, I argue that Terra 
Nova's ability to coordinate a diverse set of partnerships, specifically including governments, 
residents, and impact investors, shows how social enterprises can contribute this form of 
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Chapter I: Introduction to Informal Settlements and Social Enterprises 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As the world continues to urbanize, informal settlements arise to help meet an insufficient 
supply of affordable housing. Informal settlements, also widely referred to as slums, represent a 
cross-sectoral issue that leaves residents vulnerable due to lack of public services, lack of formal 
ownership, and social exclusion. The cross-sectoral nature of the issue, which extends from 
housing, to areas of the environment, urban planning, health, and judicial systems, can lead to 
bureaucracy-laden solutions from governments. Brazil serves as an example where several 
government agencies have arisen that address informal settlements, but a lack of collaboration 
leads to an inefficient process that excludes residents of these settlements, often causing long-
standing conflicts and violent evictions.  
I argue that social enterprises serve as a potential solution to the bureaucratic inefficiencies 
and lack of resident involvement in the slum upgrading and titling process through their incentives 
to form partnerships based on collaborative interdependence, a theory that involves establishing 
relationships based on mutual value creation. Terra Nova, a for profit legal service in Brazil, serves 
as a case study showing how social enterprises are poised to build and manage a partnership 
ecosystem in a way that can benefit slum regularization processes. Specifically, Tera Nova’s 
ability to connect with government agencies, residents of informal settlements, and “impact 
investors'' demonstrates social enterprises’ potential in these cases of large-scale slum 
regularization. 
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This chapter further details the issue of informal settlements, describes the legal context of 
Brazil, and introduces Terra Nova as a case study. This chapter also outlines the argument of this 
research and begins to introduce broader implications that extend beyond the Terra Nova case 
study. 
 
1.2 Informal Settlements Overview 
In technical terms, informal settlements are illegal land occupations that fall outside of 
government control or regulation. In a broader sense, they represent the precarious nature of urban 
expansion and the struggle of low-income populations to establish housing security. As of 2018, 
24% of the world’s urban population lived in slums, amounting to an absolute number of over 1 
billion people.1 This number continues to grow, particularly within areas experiencing rapid 
urbanization. These settlements can take the form of self-constructed shelters or squatters settling 
in abandoned homes. Or, in many cases, these informal communities have been established for 
decades, but they still lack the legal title to their land. 
The United Nations through their Housing Department defines a “slum household” as “one 
in which the inhabitants suffer one or more of the following ‘household deprivations’: Lack of 
access to: improved water source, improved sanitation facilities, sufficient living area, housing 
durability, and security of tenure.”2 Furthermore, the threat of eviction and subsequent violence 
from the state imposes a psychological burden on occupants, and because these settlements often 
locate themselves on the outskirts of the urban center, residents often become socially outcast from 
the larger society. This exclusion may also result in greater instances of crime and other informal 
 
1 Statistics Division, United Nations. 2021. “SDG Indicators.” UN Stats. United Nations. 2021. 
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/goal-11/. 
2 Statistics Division, United Nations. 2020. “Unstats | Millennium Indicators.” Unstats | Millennium Indicators. 
United Nations. 2020. https://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=32.United Nations  
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and/or illegal activities.3 Additionally, without infrastructural services and maintenance, 
informally occupied properties pose greater risks of environmental degradation, especially if they 
were built in an already environmentally precarious area.4  
In discussing the economic potential of slums, Hernando De Soto famously estimated in 
2015 there are US$ 9.3 trillion “dead assets” concentrated in the poor population of the world, and 
that these assets can only be activated by incorporating them into the formal economy.5 De Soto’s 
definition of “dead assets” refers to informally held property that remains legally unrecognized 
and cannot be exchanged for financial capital. The lack of formal ownership decreases the value 
of the property and restricts one’s ability to lend or borrow against it, leading to lost forms of value 
in the form of “dead capital.” De Soto’s estimate indicates the potential wealth increase that could 
arise for residents who gain formal property rights to their home, and also potential value added to 
local economies and real estate markets in developing nations.  
The issue of informal settlements is especially relevant in countries experiencing rapid 
urbanization, where the population growth in urban centers often does not align with the available 
housing supply. Brazil serves as an example, where 87 percent of its population lives in cities, and 
41.4 percent of this urban population lives in informal settlements known as “favelas.”6 This figure 
amounts to roughly 11.5 million people within 3.25 million households.7 The favelas serve as an 
effective case study to examine informal settlements that result from urban expansion because they 
reflect global population trends. Additionally, Brazil has created government policies in support 




5 Soto, Hernando de. 2007. The Mystery of Capital. Basic Books.13 
6 Habitat, UN. 2020. “Brazil | UN-Habitat.” UN-Habitat. 2020. https://unhabitat.org/brazil. 
7 Ibid. 
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area where regularization proves legally accessible, one can examine the conditions that help or 
hinder this process. 
 
1.3 Brazilian Context 
In 2003, the Brazilian government created the Ministry of Cities, which began to pursue 
an overarching “curative policy” that recognized informal land and urban settlements and sought 
to address them with changes in legislation and the creation of programs and investments for land 
regularization.8 These new efforts included creating the National Housing System (SNH) (Federal 
Law no 10.683 / 2003) the Council and National Social Interest Housing Fund (PLANHAB), as 
well as State and Municipal Councils and Funds. Other efforts involved establishing a requirement 
for fundraising by States and Municipalities, along with expanding their Housing Plans of Social 
Interest.9 These reforms also included a greater investment from Brazil’s “General Budget of the 
Union” (OGU), and a clear shift in public power and concern towards the issue of informal 
settlements.10  
However, some argue that these reforms appeared decades too late, where these current 
policies were addressing settlements that had existed since the 1970s and 80s;11 therefore, Brazil 
serves as a prime example of an urbanizing country where the housing demand has long outlasted 
the housing supply, and also an example of a government making strides to address these 
settlements. 
 
8 Albuquerque, André Luis Cavalcanti de. 2014. “Regularizador Social: Alternativa Privada de Regularização de 
Ocupações Informais [Social Regularizer: Private Alternative for Regularizing Informal Occupations].” 2. Lincoln 






Another development in Brazilian housing policy opened the door for regularizations, 
namely a change in Brazil’s Civil Code in 2002. Originally, Brazilian Law 6766 specified that 
landowners could not divide and sell their land into plots without having municipal and state 
authorities’ approval.12 Approval from these authorities required that the landowner pay to develop 
a proposal of an “urban project,” which involves mapping and detailing the area and identifying 
individual plots, areas for public use, and those set aside for environmental reasons. The landowner 
could not divide or sell their land without approval, and these projects typically took around four 
years to complete.13 This long and expensive process hindered market activity around these 
properties.14 Furthermore, at this point, only public agencies could initiate evictions, generating a 
dissonance between the desire of private landowners to develop their areas occupied by informal 
settlements, and public servants working on new curative policies to achieve slum upgrading 
versus eradication. 
The change that occurred in 2002 in the Civil Code established that private areas occupied 
in “good faith” and “for more than five years” by a “considerable number of people” could be 
expropriated, meaning to have the ownership removed from the landowner by court decision.15 
The law still required that landowners receive “adequate compensation,” but it no longer required 
a public agency to initiate the expropriation. The law allowed for private firms to initiate largescale 
expropriations, and potentially transfer the ownership from the landowner to the occupants through 
a judicial agreement between both parties. In other words, the law allowed for the expropriation to 
serve as a part of the regularization process for informal settlements, instead of a traditional real 
 
12 Presidencia da Republica, “Law No. 6.766,” 1979 
13 Battilana, Julie “Terra Nova: A Social Business Trying to Unlock Land Rights for the Urban Poor.” Harvard 
Business Review (January 2020). 3.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Brazilian Civil Code, “Art. 1228,” 2002  
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estate deal. This change allowed landowners and private firms to avoid aspects of Law 6766 and 
receive payment from residents before the approval of the “urban project” proposal. 
Unwittingly, through these policies the Brazilian government paved the way for a legal 
titling market, with the potential to bypass the government bureaucracy involved in achieving land 
title for residents of informal settlements by utilizing the expertise and efficiency of the private 
sector to facilitate court agreements. Around nearly the same time of these policy developments 
arose a social enterprise called Terra Nova, poised to take advantage of the opportunity.  
 
1.4 Case Study of Terra Nova 
Terra Nova remains the only social enterprise undertaking community-based 
regularizations of Brazil’s favelas.16 The company works with a variety of stakeholders and 
partners to negotiate large-scale agreements, particularly in areas of resident-landowner conflict, 
that help informal settlement communities in Brazil legally obtain and finance the land ownership 
to their property.17 More specifically, Terra Nova bases its methodology in paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
Article 1,228 of the Brazilian Civil Code which allows for judicial dispossession, or the transfer 
of ownership through court agreement.18 The article also stipulates that the landowner must be 
compensated, so Terra Nova also helps to facilitate and collect payments from residents as a part 
of their service. 
The idea for Terra Nova arose from the work of André Albuquerque, a lawyer with 
experience in urban and environmental management, as well as fundraising. In 2000, the 
government of Pinhais, Brazil, sought a solution for six communities of informal settlements, 
 




involving 3,700 residents, against whom the landowners had filed eviction lawsuits. André was 
employed to help with the negotiations between the landowner, residents, and the state authorities 
in their efforts to receive approval for an “urban project.”19 
After working with the communities of Pinhais, André inquired about residents’ 
willingness to pay affordable installments to achieve their land ownership. While community 
leaders and landowners both envisioned the benefits, a new mayoral election in Pinhais created 
political opposition that prevented André from carrying out the plan through a government 
position.20 
By 2001, André decided to open Terra Nova as a for-profit social enterprise, and they 
continue to be the “only social company in Brazil that specializes in mediation of human conflicts 
for Land Regularization of Social Interest in urban areas illegally occupied, ensuring that the 
property meets its social function.”21 Now, roughly 20 years later, Terra Nova has administered 
land ownership to 50,000 people in over thirty communities in four states: São Paulo, Paraná, Mato 
Grosso, and Rondônia, while breaking even in terms of revenue as of 2019.22 
Terra Nova has achieved worldwide recognition, receiving awards including the Social 
Entrepreneurship Award from the Schwab Foundation, a sister organization to the World 
Economic Forum, among nearly a dozen others.23 Terra Nova earned this recognition due to the 
large waves of impact achieved by their services that goes beyond the scope of a legal title.   
Benefits of land ownership, specifically in Brazil, are extensive, including access to services, social 
integration, banking and employment opportunities, as well as broader areas of health and 
 
19 Battilana et. al, “Harvard Business Review,” 3 
20 Ibid. 
21 Terra Nova “About Us” 
22 Battilana et. al, “Harvard Business Review,” 3 
23 Terra Nova “Acknowledgements”  
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wealth.24 Without land ownership, residents cannot receive public services like transportation 
infrastructure, sanitation, or electricity because the property remains unregistered and the city 
cannot demand taxes to support these public services. Terra Nova also plays a part in these areas, 
where the company works directly with municipal governments to ensure the provision of services 
such as infrastructure, i.e. roads, electricity, repairs etc.25  
Furthermore, according to the company’s principal investor, MOV Investimentos, between 
2001 and 2018, Terra Nova “directly impacted approximately 88 thousand families in São Paulo 
and Paraná, a number that represents around 10% of the total irregular occupations in these states, 
and 7% growth since [...] 2016. Among these families, 73 thousand are in conflict mediation and 
ratification processes, and 15 thousand are already in land titling processes.”26 The latter figure 
indicates that once the mediation and ratification processes complete, an additional 73 thousand 
families will enter the titling process which includes payment for their land after the ratification of 
the judicial agreement. The company specifically articulated a goal of advancing 35,363 of these 
families to land titling processes by 2022.27 
Along with the number of families involved in land titling processes, Terra Nova has made 
a significant impact on asset value and service provision. By 2018, Terra Nova helped revitalize 
around $51.5 million in property assets.28 Furthermore, the company has helped coordinate the 
implementation of four schools, eight day care centers, five health units, five social assistance 
units, fifteen community centers, and eighteen leisure areas.29 The company has also led to 
 
24 UN-Habitat “Brazil,” 
25 Albuquerque, “Social Regularizer,” 6 
26MOV Investimentos, 2019 Investment Report, Dec. 31, 2019, p. 24, from MOV Investimentos website, 
https://movinvestimentos.com.br/arquivos/MOV_ImpactReport2019.pdf, accessed January 20th, 2021 
27 Ibid., 23 
28 Ibid., 24 
29 Ibid. 
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significant advances in service provision, including the installation of 21 kilometers of water 
supply, 20.6 kilometers of energy distribution lines, 12 kilometers of sewerage, 16 kilometers of 
drainage system, and 19 kilometers of pavement.30 These are the units by which MOV measures 
these forms of service provision, but looking at a specific case study may help to better 
contextualize these results.  
To better illustrate Terra Nova’s impact, I will discuss their project in a community called 
Vila Governador. Vila Governador developed in Pinhais, Paraná, during the 1990s when 
approximately 200 families occupied what was then an agricultural plantation. The owner had 
plans to allot the space into parcels or to rent it as a parking lot for buses; however, they could not 
pursue the project due to the volume of families occupying the area. The community Resident 
Association made an inquiry at the Pinhais city hall, where public agents recommended Terra 
Nova’s services in regularizing the community. 
The total land area within the occupation amounts to 58.220,55 m², including 139 lots, and 
556 residents, which indicates the magnitude of impacts Terra Nova’s services create for the 
community. Furthermore, Terra Nova has facilitated the installation of a water distribution 
network, electric energy network, sewage collection network, drainage network, paved streets, 
streets with zip code, curbs, a bus line for public transport, an elementary school, a social assistance 











Figure 1.3: Vila Governador 200833 Figure 1.4: Vila Governador 2008 Cont.34 
 






Figure 1.5: Vila Governador Community 
Street 201035 
Figure 1.6: Vila Governador Community 














Figure 1.9: Vila Governador Community 
Street 2017 Cont.39 
Figure 1.10: School Built Adjacent to Vila 
Governador40 
 
This example shows how an ideal regularization process progresses over time, and the 
pictures demonstrate the benefits in the form of physical upgrading, as well as access to resources 
like education and transportation. Other benefits of land ownership are psychological, with 
residents experiencing increased security, safety, higher self-esteem, and overall less stress, as the 
threat of eviction can lead to prolonged anxiety and uncertainty.41 Furthermore, due to the threat 
of eviction, some residents are unable to leave their home for fear that their belongings will be 
removed. This prevents occupants from finding employment.42   
The benefits Terra Nova generates reach a global subset of the population known as the 
Base of the Pyramid, or those who live with an income less than $3,000 per year.43 This population 




41 UN-Habitat “Brazil”  
42 De Castro “FACTS Report”  
43 London “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 25 
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yet it also represents a group of resilient individuals who can be uplifted by the strategic efforts of 
a social enterprise, like Terra Nova.  
 
1.5 Barriers to Formalization in Favelas  
Terra Nova serves occupants within three social classes in Brazil, namely C, D, and E, 
which are classified by multipliers of the minimum wage, which currently stands at R$1,039, or 
$183.00 per month.44 Typically, Terra Nova serves a range of those who earn no more than $10,000 
and less than $3,300 per year. Here, we see that Terra Nova includes residents other than those in 
the absolute Base of the Pyramid; however, the issue of informal settlements impacts those of the 
Base of the Pyramid around the world. Additionally, many barriers to access to the formal property 
market are the same for those even of slightly higher socioeconomic classes. 
One of Terra Nova’s founding members Daniel Albuquerque outlines the barriers residents 
face to achieving title, and cites that it is nearly impossible: “You need to receive mail, like bills, 
letters from the court, and often residents can't have a mail system because they are irregular, they 
have no official address.”45 Furthermore, Terra Nova specializes in situations of large-scale 
regularizations that involve entire communities, and specifically in areas of ownership conflict. 
These defining characteristics point to the barriers faced by residents. For a large-scale 
regularization to take place, meaning that the ownership is transferred to the community as a whole 
as opposed to through contracts with individual households, the community must be represented 
by their Resident Association. These Resident Associations must also be formalized with bylaws, 
so that the group may be recognized by the court. Similar logistical barriers hamper this process, 
 
44 The Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IGBE), “Social Classes in Brazil”  
45 Albuquerque, Daniel. (Terra Nova co-founder). “Interview with Daniel Albuquerque.” March 15th, 2021. 
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where limited ability to receive mail and correspond with the court system may leave Resident 
Associations without legal standing, along with the properties. 
Furthermore, large-scale regularizations face additional barriers when compounded with 
conflict between residents and the landowner due to an inability to negotiate a deal, and with 
tensions on both sides that could likely lead to a violent or forced removal of residents.46 In some 
cases, the conflict has been long standing, where residents may have purchased property from a 
former resident not knowing that the property was informally occupied, thereby creating an 
informal sale under the original landowner, with the new occupant largely unaware of the property 
title procedures and history, thereby inadvertently entering into a conflict.47 
Along with seeking title to their property, favela residents more immediately require public 
infrastructure provision and services, but to access these services residents face bureaucracy from 
the state and municipal governments due to a “box model” of government that divides public 
agencies into different ministries, i.e., secretary of housing, health, education, etc.48 While public 
authorities offer different resources and agencies to help, regularization requires a series of actions 
from these agencies that must be done in a collaborative manner, yet the public power struggles to 
coordinate all of these activities.49  
Terra Nova steps in to help organize all groups in the system, including residents, 
landowners, public authorities, and registry offices, to overcome these bureaucratic challenges. 
The group works to negotiate between parties, thereby overcoming longstanding conflict between 
 
46Albuquerque, Daniel. (Terra Nova co-founder). “Interview with Daniel Albuquerque.” March 15th, 2021.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Barki, Edgard et. al. “Reflexões sobre o papel dos governos no campo dos negócios de impacto [Reflections on 
the role of governments in the field of impact business]” in Negócios de impacto socioambiental no Brasil 
[Socioenvironmental Impact Businesses in Brazil]. Edited by Sandro Gomes dos Santos and Marco Antonio Corrêa. 
1st edition. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: FGV Editora, 2019.  
http://ice.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Neg%C3%B3cios-de-impacto-socioambiental-no-Brasil_ebook.pdf 
49 Albuquerque, Daniel. (Terra Nova co-founder). “Interview with Daniel Albuquerque.” March 15th, 2021.  
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residents and landowners, while also bypassing government bureaucracy through their efficiency 
as a private social enterprise to form and coordinate an ecosystem of diverse partners. 
I posit that Terra Nova’s identity as a BoP-impact oriented social enterprise serves to incentivize 
the company to help create these negotiations, agreements, and partnerships that did not exist 
before, and that their ability to manage these partnerships shows a missing piece in regularization 
systems that could be addressed by including a social enterprise in other geographic and legal 
contexts.  
 
1.6 Social Impact Enterprise Theory: 
The term “social enterprise” refers to an organization that applies commercial strategies to 
achieve social benefit, where the enterprise funds their social impacts wholly or partly by 
reinvesting profits made by the organization to create social capital.50 These enterprises can take 
many forms, but many seek to serve the Base of the Pyramid, the most socially and economically 
vulnerable segment of the global population. Operating in a BoP market requires social enterprises 
to make strategic decisions that differ from those made in a traditional market setting due to the 
differences in market conditions. 
  Some manifestations of working in a developing context may include a lack of formal 
market infrastructures and existing consumer demand. The biggest difference between a 
developing market and a developed market lies in the mindset of “fortune finding,” versus “fortune 
creating.”51 More specifically, fortune finding applies to markets in developed contexts, where 
there are formal markets already established and strengthened with long-standing infrastructure 
 
50 Social Enterprise Alliance. “What is a Social Enterprise?” Social Enterprise Alliance. Accessed March 20th, 
2021. https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise/  
51 London, “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 31 
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and consumer activity. The goal for a traditional business in this context would be to find segments 
of the existing market that the company can appeal to. Conversely, in developing BoP contexts, 
“fortune creating” proves more important, where business leaders must take steps to create a new 
market, facilitate demand, and become involved in helping establish formalized structures.52  
In operating within a BoP market context, social enterprises must undertake partnership 
building strategies that Dr. Ted London writes to inform in his book Base of the Pyramid Promise: 
Building Businesses with Impact and Scale. A specific part of London’s strategic guides that I will 
focus on includes a section on building what he calls a “Partnership Ecosystem,” using the 
“Partnership Ecosystem Framework” and the theory of “collaborative interdependence.” The 
premise of this framework and theory lies in the enterprise’s need for a wide range of partners to 
help facilitate their activities in the non-traditional developing market setting. Relating back to the 
point about “fortune creating,” social enterprises operating in developing market contexts are 
incentivized to create partnerships to help establish a market, which requires activities such as 
gathering market intelligence of the cultural context. Gathering cultural context and creating a 
market from the ground up requires a closer form of partnership with members of the BoP 
population than that of a traditional for-profit company, or even from governments and nonprofit 
NGOs.  
Furthermore, London uses the theory of collaborative interdependence to explain how the 
enterprises’ partnerships should be managed, where he points to the importance of approaching 
the partnership ecosystem with a goal of mutual value creation for all partners. He explains how 
an enterprises’ partnership goals can overlap and reinforce one another, and that using a mindset 
 
52 Ibid., 32 
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of collaborative interdependence helps create an aggregation of value that could not exist with the 
partners operating separately. 
All of these theories tie back to Terra Nova, and I will use the Partnership Ecosystem 
Framework to show how Terra Nova is incentivized as a social enterprise to form partnerships 
within the regularization system that did not exist before. I will relate these findings to a larger 
claim about how the theory of collaborative interdependence can serve as an effective approach 
for large-scale regularizations.  
 
1.7 Argument 
In accordance with the theory of collaborative interdependence, social impact enterprises 
must create partnerships with a variety of organizations and stakeholders to ensure their success 
in generating economic and social impact, as well as in expanding and scaling their enterprises to 
reach more members of the BoP. I argue that Terra Nova embodies this theory in its methodology 
and serves as a case study that shows how social enterprises should be incorporated into large-
scale regularization processes. 
Furthermore, I seek to tie this idea to a broader claim about how informal settlements 
require a view of collaborative interdependence because of the sector-spanning nature of the issues 
they face, from property rights, to banking, social services, infrastructure provision, health, and 
the environment etc. Social enterprises should be engaged in the system because they are 
incentivized by their economic and social impact goals to form and manage interdependent cross-
sectoral partnerships and can help governments overcome an inefficient “box model.” 
I also argue that Terra Nova shows how social enterprises are incentivized to form 
partnerships and pursue relationships specifically with members of the population who inhabit 
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informal settlements in ways that are not satisfied by policymakers alone. In pursuing these 
interactions and partnerships, social enterprises serve as a solution to barriers that prevent residents 
of informal settlements from peacefully entering the formal property system.  
Lastly, I claim that Terra Nova’s identity as a social enterprise leads to relationships with 
“impact investors,” or those who share both the company’s economic and social goals. I argue that 
these relationships are inherently based in collaborative interdependence, particularly when 
compared with traditional for-profit investors and non-profit donors. Social enterprises are 
incentivized to build these relationships with impact investors, which eventually helps concentrate 
resources to a social issue, while helping to stimulate economic returns. The housing sector 
involves high upfront costs and long-term returns, so I argue that impact investors prove 
particularly important to involve in large-scale regularization processes. 
The subsequent chapters will support my claims, beginning with Chapter 2 that includes 
an overview of my methodology and describes my primary sources of evidence. This chapter also 
outlines the interview protocol used in a discussion with Terra Nova founder Mr. Daniel 
Albuquerque. Furthermore, this chapter introduces and explains London’s Partnership Ecosystem 
Framework, and discusses how my approach to this framework differs from London’s. 
Chapter 3 introduces the theory of collaborative interdependence and details how this 
theory aids relationships with governments, residents, and impact investors. Specifically, this 
chapter discusses Brazil’s box model of governance to illustrate the bureaucracy that plagues the 
slum regularization system. Chapter 3 also discusses how Terra Nova’s interactions with residents 
help them overcome barriers to participation in the formal property system. Lastly, this chapter 
discusses how social enterprises like Terra Nova concentrate resources to social issues through 
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their partnerships with impact investors to support a larger claim about the benefits of social 
enterprises’ approach of collaborative interdependence. 
Chapter 4 uses London’s Partnership Ecosystem Framework to show how social enterprise-
specific market activities incentivize partnership building by categorizing Terra Nova’s 
partnerships in the framework. This chapter also illustrates Terra Nova’s methodology to show 
where these partnerships arise while specifically identifying and discussing these partners. This 
chapter also includes synthesis of the interdependence of these partners across quadrants of the 
framework. 
Chapter 5 discusses potential limitations and implications of my approach extending 
beyond Terra Nova in Brazil to other enterprises and geographical contexts. More specifically, I 
will identify factors for consideration that may help or hinder the transferability of my argument 
to other enterprises. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this opening chapter I discussed the issue of informal settlements and narrowed the 
research focus to Brazil due to its status as an urbanizing country that faces a housing deficit. Then, 
I introduced the legal context in Brazil regarding how informal settlements have historically been 
recognized, while identifying some of the policies meant to address informal settlements. After 
establishing that the “favelas” in Brazil serve as a case study for understanding urban slum 
development and issues surrounding ownership, I then introduced the solution: social enterprise 
Terra Nova.  
Terra Nova serves as a social enterprise, and one oriented to serve the BoP, a term used by 
researchers to categorize the four billion people who make up the lowest segment of the global 
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income pyramid with an annual income of less than $3,000. I argue that taking a BoP-oriented 
approach of collaborative interdependence should be used when looking at issues surrounding 
informal settlements because these environments require cross-sectoral partnerships which can be 




















Chapter II: Methods & Frameworks 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will introduce the forms of evidence used to support the argument that 
Terra Nova demonstrates how social enterprises are incentivized to manage partnerships in a way 
that can help coordinate cross-sectoral solutions for large-scale informal settlements. I will also 
further explain my choice to work with the theory of collaborative interdependence and the 
Partnership Ecosystem Framework (PEF). 
I will introduce each element of the PEF and explain how I will tailor the framework to 
Terra Nova’s case. My approach to the framework differs from London’s original approach. This 
chapter will clarify the points of difference between the two uses of the framework and explain 
how my approach will suit my argument.  
 
2.2 Methods Overview 
I chose to use the Partnership Ecosystem Framework and the theory of collaborative 
interdependence because these ideas are the most comprehensive set of tools and strategies that 
seek to guide enterprises in creating and managing an ecosystem of partnerships.53 The framework 
helps organize the company’s partners based on the different enterprise-specific activities that are 
required for the success of the company. The theory of collaborative interdependence then 
provides specific strategies for managing these partnerships and creating a relationship based on 
mutual benefit.54  
 
53 London, “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 135. 
54 Ibid. 170 
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This research also draws from is a translated text book titled Negócios de impacto 
socioambiental no Brasil,55 or “Socioenvironmental Impact Businesses in Brazil” from the 
Instituto de Cidadania Empresarial (ICE), or Corporate Citizens Institute, a non-profit civil society 
organization, along with the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), or Getulio Vargas Foundation 
which serves as a secondary education organization and think tank. This textbook includes theory 
for social enterprises that I plan to use to supplement London’s perspective. Furthermore, ICE has 
a connection with the Schwab-Ashoka Changemakers Foundation, which partners with Terra 
Nova. This source thereby provides information about the partnership offerings for the Schwab-
Ashoka Changemakers Foundation, as well as information about Terra Nova itself, as they are 
featured as a case in the book. Lastly, the book provides a specific Brazilian context for discussing 
social enterprises. 
Another source that provides models and frameworks for social enterprises include Virtue 
Ventures’ “Four Lenses Strategic Framework” created by founder Kim Alter.56 This framework 
identifies four common performance criteria that lead to increased sustainability: depth of impact, 
blended value, efficiency, and adaptability. I chose to use Professor London’s framework instead 
of Alter’s Four Lenses because his framework provides more specific information for evaluating 
the partnerships formed by the company and provides more concrete strategies to manage cross-
sectoral partnerships, in contrast to the more general, theoretical approach taken by Alter. 
I also utilize interviews conducted with Daniel Albuquerque, a founding member of the 
company. These interviews will help provide insight about how the company manages its 
 
55 Barki, Edgard et. al. Negócios de impacto socioambiental no Brasil [Socioenvironmental Impact Businesses in 
Brazil]. 2019.           
56 Alter, Kim. “The Four Lenses Strategic Framework,” Virtue Ventures. 2020. January 8th, 2021. 
http://www.4lenses.org/framework 
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partnerships and provide anecdotal evidence that does not appear in existing reports. The questions 
used in the interview include: 
 
1. What do you see as some obvious barriers for residents of informal settlements to achieve 
property title on their own?  
2. Before your work or in situations where you are not operating, what is the level of 
involvement from the government to enact policies aimed at regularization? What is the 
level of interaction with favela residents by other parties, i.e. public agencies and 
landowners? 
3. How does your identity as a social enterprise locate you within your larger system of 
partners? 
4. How would you describe the company’s purpose between generating revenue and 
generating social impacts? 
5. What are the metrics you use to measure your level of success? 
○ Do you use the same metrics as your investors, or do they require additional or 
different metrics for understanding success? 
6. How do you interact with the residents and are there boundaries for interactions? 
○ Do you conduct interviews with residents and if so, what is the structure of those 
interviews? How do you choose which residents to interview or follow up with? 
7. Can you walk me through your organizational structure? 
8. What is taken care of by your internal team, and what activities require the most 
outreach/reliance on partnerships? 
9. How do you manage your Cooperation Agreements and Technical Chambers? 
10. How do you address potential barriers to collaboration: 
○ Perceptions about subsidized support 
○ Dealing with internal resistance 
○ Responding to cross-organizational tensions 
 
The first question aims to understand how the regularization process operates with and 
without Terra Nova, and Mr. Daniel Albuquerque provided local context and insight about these 
processes. Question one helped contribute to the discussion in the opening chapter surrounding the 
logistical barriers that favela residents face, an insight which would have been difficult to obtain 
without direct interaction with residents. Question two also helped provide insight into the 
government bureaucracy, which can prove difficult to estimate without having experienced the 
system firsthand. While this research includes other peer-reviewed and historical sources that 
discuss Brazil’s policies, the interview with Daniel helps to provide a field-based perspective. 
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Question three aims to gauge how Terra Nova’s identity as a social enterprise affects its 
relationships with its partners. Daniel also provided commentary about how the company is 
received as a social enterprise in Brazil in terms of the media, award recognition, and investor 
interest. Question four seeks to understand whether Terra Nova has profit-driven goals separate 
from their social goals, or if their economic returns are primarily expected to sustain the social 
objectives. These questions about Terra Nova’s identity help speak to broader characteristics of 
social enterprises as a whole.  
Question five attempts to understand how the company measures its success, and how it 
manages metrics imposed by other partners. This question has implications for how well 
collaborative interdependence may work in the context of social enterprises given that their 
partners may measure their success differently. Furthermore, this question leads to a discussion 
about the importance of finding appropriate investors who understand Terra Nova’s social and 
financial goals. The answer to this question contributes to the argument about how these 
enterprises help concentrate resources to social issues by forming partnerships with impact 
investors. 
  Question six asks about Terra Nova’s relationship with residents because Terra Nova’s 
community outreach serves as an example of a BoP Impact Enterprise oriented activity.  Given 
that outreach to BoP communities has been a problem for public agencies, it proves valuable to 
understand how social enterprises are uniquely incentivized to foster relationships with residents. 
Furthermore, this question seeks to identify the protocol for interacting with residents during the 
project. Daniel provided information about how the socioeconomic surveys and stakeholder 
testimonials are gathered.  
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Question seven asks about the organizational structure of the company to understand how 
the partnerships are managed. Understanding the company’s organizational structure helps speak 
to the logistics behind the theory of collaborative interdependence, specifically regarding the roles 
on the team responsible for partnership coordination activities. 
Question eight mainly seeks to generate information to apply to different market-based activities 
outlined in the Partnership Ecosystem Framework and to fill in gaps from public information. 
Since partnerships remain an integral part of Terra Nova’s business model, it can prove difficult 
to distinguish between the work done by different entities, particularly between Terra Nova and 
public agencies.  
Question nine seeks to explore two of Terra Nova’s major instruments for cooperation, 
including legal agreements, and an ad hoc technical chamber. The Cooperation Agreements 
represent a novel part of Terra Nova’s services, where the company constructs a document and 
negotiates with residents and landowners who previously could not be within the same room with 
one another due to deep-seated conflict. By then bringing these agreements to the court, Terra 
Nova also solves long standing issues for the judiciary, who previously often had to make difficult 
rulings in cases that left one side (typically residents) worse off. 
Lastly, question ten specifically references barriers that London identifies in managing a 
partnership ecosystem. He posits addressing these barriers using collaborative interdependence, so 
question ten tries to understand Terra Nova’s approach to these barriers to see how this aligns with 
London’s theory.  
My ability to generate evidence from this interview was limited in that the conversation 
required live interpretation between English and Portuguese. Since I do not speak Portuguese, I 
was limited in asking follow-up questions. It proved difficult to follow the conversations live, and 
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many of the original questions I hoped to answer could not be addressed due to the extended time 
required for live interpretation. Furthermore, the interview was recorded, transcribed in Portuguese 
using an online transcription service, and then translated to English.57 While the transcriptions 
were reviewed after the interview, room for error arises in regard to the precisely translated 
wording for quoting purposes.  
I also utilize publications from the company founder, André Albuquerque, including an 
article published through the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy called: “Social Regularizer: Private 
alternative for regularizing informal occupations.”58 This publication proves particularly important 
because it comes directly from the founder and describes the company’s methodologies, as well 
as case study examples to draw from in generating specific pieces of evidence to speak to different 
market activities outlined the Partnership Ecosystem Framework, and the theory of collaborative 
interdependence. 
Another report I reference is titled “An experience of Regularization Private Urban in 
Brazil: The Case of Terra Nova Urban Land Regularization Ltda.,” written by a team of researchers 
and contributed to by founder André Albuquerque. The report provides insightful historical 
background analyzing the legal and institutional frameworks for urban regularization in Brazil and 
the problems it faces, which contributes to the discussion about barriers to access for residents. 
Furthermore, the report outlines Terra Nova’s methodology, and provides a case study of Villa 
Marinho in Paranáguá. Lastly, the report evaluates the costs and benefits of the process particularly 
in regard to the indirect benefits of regularization on land prices. This evidence helps to assess the 
idea of mutual value creation in regard to the theory of collaborative interdependence. 
 
57 IRB00000246 
58 De Albuquerque, André “Regularizador Social: Alternativa privada de regularização de ocupações informais 
[Social Regularizer: Private alternative for regularizing informal occupations]” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
(July, 2014) https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-papers/regularizador-social. 
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Other evidence that will be utilized in this research includes a business analysis report from 
the Harvard Business Review (HBR) titled, “Terra Nova: A Social Business Trying to Unlock 
Land Rights for the Urban Poor in Brazil.”59 This review provides financial information about the 
company, including the company’s revenues through 2019, as well as a thorough history of the 
country’s growth since 2001. Furthermore, the report helps describe the organizational and team 
structure of the enterprise, and even lists the number of team members and their role.  
The report proves particularly useful in its interviews of the company founders, as well as 
representatives from the company’s investor, MOV Investimentos. These interviews help speak to 
their specific experiences that I draw from as examples to illustrate my findings. The report also 
provides a breakdown of all the land settlements Terra Nova has helped regularize, including 
information regarding the specific favela communities such as the total population, those who have 
“bought in'' to Terra Nova’s program, the total area of their lots, the price of the property per square 
meter, the average monthly installment made by residents, the year negotiations started, and lastly 
the year of the judicial agreement.  
These factors will provide useful background information about the history of the company 
and their results. The report also presents an advantage in its publishing date, January 2020, 
meaning the information is relatively up to date and can speak to the company’s most recent 
activities.   
 Another source of information includes a Facts Report titled “How a Brazilian Firm is 
Sustainably Solving the Problems of Urban Slums, One Community at a Time.”60 This report 
overviews Terra Nova’s methods in pursuing regularization, detailing the process from the 
 
59 Battilana et. al, “Terra Nova” 2020 
60 De Castro, Diana “How a Brazilian Firm is Sustainably Solving the Problems of Urban Slums, One Community 
at a Time.” The Journal of Field Actions Science Reports Special Edition 3 (2011) 
https://journals.openedition.org/factsreports/1649 
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beginning stage, a viability study, to the project approval and management stage. The report goes 
into detail regarding Terra Nova’s interaction with the communities it seeks to serve, and I will 
correlate the information about interactions with the BoP to different incentives outlined in 
Partnership Ecosystem Framework.  
The only apparent disadvantage of the report arises from the date of publication, 2011. The 
company has changed significantly from this point in regard to the investors involved and in 
achieving financial viability, so the report will need to be supplemented with more recent 
information from the Harvard Business Report, the interview with Daniel Albuquerque, and André 
Albuquerque’s more recent publications. 
I also use investment reports from MOV Investimentos, a principal investor in the company 
who joined in 2011. There are two reports, one from 201661 and the other from 201962 that outline 
the level of investment and the outcomes generated by Terra Nova. These two reports will help 
speak to the benefits that MOV offers Terra Nova as a partner, and their measurements of growth 
are used to establish Terra Nova’s success in achieving economic and social impact. Publications 
from MOV present a disadvantage in that they primarily highlight Terra Nova’s success and fail 
to discuss any pitfalls or barriers that the company has faced. Therefore, I will need to approach 
this source with a critical lens and supplement this information with more objective sources, 
including the FACTS report and the HBR case study. 
Furthermore, I draw from publications by some of Terra Nova’s other partners, including 
The Global Land Alliance63 as well as the Schwab Foundation and the Ashoka Changemakers 
 
61 MOV Investimentos, Impact Report 2016, from MOV Investimentos website, 
https://movinvestimentos.com.br/arquivos/RelatorioImpacto_Mov-Ingles.pdf, accessed January 20th, 2021 
62 MOV Investimentos “Impact Report 2019” 
63 Corcoran, Christen. 2020. “Terra Nova:  A Sustainable Solution to Tenure Security and Recognition for Favelas 
in Brazil, Global Land Alliance.” Global Land Alliance. Global Land Alliance. February 24, 2020. 
36 
Network,64 which will contribute to discussions surrounding these partnerships. These 
publications, along with MOV’s reports, include information that can be applied to the PEF by 
discussing how the partnerships were formed and the incentives for partnership formation, along 
with the benefits provided by these partners to Terra Nova, as well as the benefits Terra Nova can 
provide these partners. 
Other evidence includes information from the company’s website.65 This website includes 
videos explaining the company’s methodology, as well as testimonials from residents who 
benefited from Terra Nova’s services, and I will use this evidence to speak to the company’s use 
of collaborative interdependence, as well as their relationship with members of the BoP. The 
website also includes pictures that show the changes in land before and after attaining title and 
receiving service provision from the government. These pictures help illustrate the impacts of the 
company that extend beyond securing a legal title. The website also lists the company’s mission, 
vision, and values, which speaks to the company’s identity as a social enterprise. 
The disadvantage of using Terra Nova partners’ publications and their company website is 
that the company and its partners favor publishing positive reports and feedback over potentially 
negative reviews or impacts. This information such as the stakeholder testimonials should be 
viewed critically and supplemented by other sources of information.  
This research includes other general information and statistics about informal settlements 




64Ashoka. n.d. “Sustainable Land Regularization - Social, Economic and Environmental Transformation | 
Changemakers.” Changemakers. Ashoka Changemakers Network. Accessed April 17, 2021. 
https://www.changemakers.com/property-rights/entries/sustainable-land-regularization-social-economic-and. 
65 Terra Nova “https://grupoterranova.com.br/en/” 
66 UN-Habitat, “Brazil” 
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World Bank,67 and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)68 that help speak to 
the demographics of those living in favelas and also point to some of the general barriers and 
conditions faced by residents of informal settlements. 
 
Discussion of Translations: 
Three major sources of evidence required translation from Portuguese to English. Firstly, 
the interview with Daniel Albuquerque required live interpretation that was provided by Professor 
Johnathan DeVore from University of Louisiana at Lafayette. The conversation was recorded via 
the video conferencing software Zoom and then transcribed by the author using an online 
transcription/translation service called Happy Scribe.69 The second major source that required 
translation from Portuguese to English includes the textbook Negócios de impacto socioambiental 
no Brasil. I used Google Translate’s “upload document” function to translate large portions of the 
text. Lastly, I translated one of Andre Albuquerque’s publications, “Regularizador Social: 
Alternativa Privada de Regularização de Ocupações Informais.” I similarly used Google Translate 
for this source, but I took steps to verify some aspects of the terminology during the discussion 
with Daniel Albuquerque in the interview, such as for the Multi-Stakeholder Councils and 
Technical Chambers. Overall, since I undertook these translations using online services, I am liable 
for any misinterpretations of the material I present. 
 
67World Bank. 2011. “Brazil Land Assessment - Legalizing Brazil: Brazil’s New Push for Land Regularization, 
Land Governance and Land Management - What It Means for Affordable Housing, Urban Development and the 
Last Frontier of the Amazon.” World Bank. June 2011. 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/608151468017074350/pdf/697080ESW0P1020ent0June020110Final3.p
df 
68 Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. n.d. “Institutional IBGE.” IBGE, Portal Do IBGE. IBGE. 
Accessed April 17, 2021. https://www.ibge.gov.br/en/institutional/the-ibge.html. 
69 Happy Scribe. 2021. “Happy Scribe: Transcription & Subtitles | Speech to Text.” Happy Scribe. 2021. 
https://www.happyscribe.com/.  
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Now that I have laid out my sources of evidence, I will move on to introduce the partnership 
ecosystem framework through which this evidence will be applied. 
 
2.3 Partnership Ecosystem Framework 
To operate successfully in BoP markets, London identifies a need for a diverse set of 
partners. According to London, “the Partnerships Ecosystem Framework provides a strategic 
perspective that allows enterprise leaders to organize and categorize their current partnership 
ecosystem and compare that to their partnership needs.”71 My use of the framework proves similar 
to London’s by identifying partners that provide support through different enterprise activities such 
as “financial capital,” or “market intelligence,” but my discussion surrounding the framework will 
 
70 London, “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 149 
71 Ibid. 148 
 
Figure 2: Partnership Ecosystem Framework Diagram70 
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differ. My discussion will focus on how these enterprise activities incentivize the formation of 
partnerships, whereas London focuses on identifying areas in the framework where partnerships 
could be strengthened. Instead of taking a strategic perspective that seeks to generate 
recommendations for the enterprise in managing their partnership ecosystem, I am making a claim 
about how Terra Nova is already successful in managing their partners, and how the PEF illustrates 
collaborative interdependence within Brazil’s regularization system. 
The framework divides the partners between those who facilitate enterprise development, 
and those who enhance market creation. Within these sections, the partners are further divided into 
those who are action enabling, and those who are capacity building. The concepts “action 
enabling” and “capacity building” refer to different kinds of support that London refers to as “stock 
and flow.” Flow refers to the total number and/or value of transactions, and London correlates 
flow with “actional enabling” support made by partners who help “facilitate enterprise activities” 
and “facilitate market transactions.” Stock refers to the value of assets, as London correlates this 
to “capacity building” support by partners who “enhance enterprise resources” and “enhance 
market environment.”  
More specifically, for “action enabling” partners focused on “enterprise development,” the 
framework specifies activities to help facilitate transactions, or flow, including enhancing “market 
intelligence,” “market access,” and “value creation.”72 Beginning with “market intelligence,” 
London specifies that this could involve a partner that helps gather information about local 
customs, consumer preferences and constraints, as well as supplier gaps and challenges.73 He also 
notes that market intelligence involves understanding existing competition, but this concept will 
 
72 Ibid. 150 
73 London, “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 150 
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prove less relevant in Terra Nova’s case because they are the only company in Brazil undertaking 
this niche service. 
“Market access” refers to a partner who can “act as a catalyst in building relationships 
between the enterprise and a wider distribution network.” Market access proves particularly 
relevant for Terra Nova because they specialize in large-scale community regularizations, meaning 
that they prefer the agreements to involve the community as a whole as opposed to individual deals 
with residents. This means that to enact their services Terra Nova needs a partner who can provide 
access to an entire community and ensure their adherence to the process. 
Lastly, under this section, the framework requires a partner devoted to value creation by 
assessing poverty impacts. Assessing poverty impacts proves important for facilitating the flow of 
enterprise activities because these metrics prove more relevant to measuring the enterprises’ 
success than solely financial measures. By involving a partner that assesses poverty impacts, an 
enterprise can better strategize to meet their social and economic goals. 
Keeping with the concept of “flow,” I will move onto the “market creation” portion of the 
framework, which refers to partners who can facilitate market transactions through “demand 
creation,” and “supply enhancement.”74 For demand creation, there should be a partner who assists 
in awareness raising, and behavior change, as well as in providing microcredit or other sources of 
financing to BoP consumers. Awareness raising may refer to a partner that helps with advertising 
or other means of connecting with the target population, for demand for an enterprise’s product or 
service cannot truly exist if the consumer or beneficiary does not know of the enterprise itself, 
particularly in a developing or informal market context. Behavior change can involve a partner 
who educates consumers on the value propositions offered by the enterprise. This concept proves 
 
74 Ibid. 152 
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particularly important for Terra Nova in regard to convincing residents to join in on a large-scale 
community transformation. Lastly, a partner who can help the enterprise provide micro-crediting 
or subsidy options can help lower the price and increase accessibility of the enterprises’ services 
for BoP consumers, thereby facilitating more transactions within this group. 
Moving onto the bottom of the framework that focuses on “stock,” I will begin with 
“capacity building” support by partners that “enhance enterprise resources.” The framework 
identifies four areas for partnerships, including those who improve financial capital, human capital, 
knowledge capital, and social capital.75 Regarding financial capital, the partner should be able to 
supply grants, equity, debt, or loan guarantees. Depending on the specific needs and functions of 
the three enterprises this research will analyze, a financial partner in this case could likely include 
an impact investor who is understanding that BoP oriented enterprises typically do not generate 
rapid returns on their investment, but with patience and development can scale and become 
profitable over time.76 For human capital, this partner should be focused on talent development 
and technical assistance within the enterprise team.77 Specific actions by these partners may 
involve training the enterprise team in business or technical skills, or providing direct access to 
talented team members who can complement the venture’s existing team.78 
Moving onto knowledge capital, there should be a partner who can provide structured 
processes, tools, and frameworks to guide the development of the enterprise.79 Specifically, this 
knowledge may come from a partner in the social enterprise field who has expertise in developing 





78 Ibid. 151 
79 Ibid. 
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Lastly, for social capital, the partner should be able to enhance legitimacy and provide access to 
local networks.80 In Terra Nova’s case, international entrepreneurship networks can serve to 
increase legitimacy by publishing and sharing Terra Nova’s methodology with others and 
connecting them to other likeminded entrepreneurs, thereby increasing the “stock” or value of 
Terra Nova’s access. 
Onto the last section, for “capacity building” partners under “market creation,” there should 
be partners that enhance the market environment by improving the value chain infrastructure.81 
Here London references partners who can help the enterprise enhance its competitiveness and 
performance within its industry. This section could involve physical infrastructure development, 
quality assurance and certification, and market transparency. Interestingly, Terra Nova takes on 
this role as its principal service, where it creates a legal titling market, helps ensure physical 
infrastructure development through the municipal government, and ensures market transparency 
by managing its system of partners. Considering that market creation is such a large part of Terra 
Nova’s value proposition, it proves less relevant to look at in terms of needing partnership support, 
but this section still offers an interesting conversation from the perspective of the grounds for 
partnership formation.  
For “legal infrastructure,” having a partner that specializes in policy changes and regulation 
enforcement can increase a company’s “stock” by allowing the business to have more favorable 
operating conditions. Ensuring a conducive legal structure proves crucial for Terra Nova 
considering a large part of their service involves judicial agreements that depend on a specific 
clause within the country’s Civil Code. 
 
80 Ibid. 152 
81 Ibid. 
43 
Lastly, there should be partnerships to support the “institutional infrastructure,” which 
includes banking, legal knowledge, and the property sector.82 Especially considering the nature of 
the developing market environment which displays elements of informality, having a partner that 
encourages the establishment and legitimacy of the market helps to activate these informal assets. 
This section also proves particularly relevant for Terra Nova since they work directly in 
transitioning informal property markets to formal ones. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I provided an overview of my methodology by describing the sources of 
evidence I chose to use, and I also outlined the interview protocol I used in generating evidence 
directly from Terra Nova. Furthermore, I explained how these sources will be used to support a 
discussion of the theory of collaborative interdependence, as well as the Partnership Ecosystem 
Framework.  
 In the next chapter, I will explain the theory of collaborative interdependence, and discuss 
how this theory broadly applies to relationships with governments, impact investors, and the BoP. 
I will also focus the discussion on the case of Terra Nova and set the stage for the Partnership 






82 Ibid. 153 
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Chapter III: Collaborative Interdependence in Engaging Governments, 
Residents, and Investors 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explain the logic of collaborative interdependence, a theory that focuses 
on the opportunity for mutual value creation between partners, and I will elucidate the need for 
this approach in the context of the informal settlement regularization system. More specifically, I 
will discuss how collaborative interdependence applies to relationships with governments, 
residents of informal settlements, and impact investors. For governments, I will explain how 
collaborative interdependence helps overcome a “box model” of increasingly divided agencies and 
ministries that lead to greater bureaucracy and inefficiency. For residents of informal settlements, 
collaborative interdependence leads to long-standing, interactive relationships that fit the long-
term, multifaceted nature of the issues they face. For “impact investors” social enterprises enter 
into financial relationships structured upon collaborative interdependence, and I will compare the 
structure of these relationships to those of donor-dependent nonprofits and traditional for-profit 
companies. These three dimensions help show how collaborative interdependence works within 
individual partnership before applying this theory to Terra Nova’s management of their partnership 
ecosystem more broadly.  
 
3.2 Theory of Collaborative Interdependence 
According to London: “Collaborative interdependence is a partnership in which each party 
has to recognize on a fundamental level that the organizations’ economic and social performance 
goals are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, can overlap with and reinforce each other; that 
working together can create new strategies and capabilities that generate value that neither party 
could create alone; and that achieving this mutual value creation will require sharing and 
45 
integrating skills, knowledge, values, and perspectives.”83 I will continue to expand on this 
explanation and show how Terra Nova embodies these concepts in managing its partnership 
ecosystem.  
Stepping through the elements of collaborative interdependence as described by London, I 
will begin with the idea that “organizations’ economic and social performance goals are not 
mutually exclusive and can overlap to reinforce one another.”84 The organizations in question 
include both the social enterprise, and its ecosystem of partners. The social enterprise, in this case, 
Terra Nova, has social and economic goals of their own in regard to generating impact and being 
able to scale and expand this impact. Other partners in the ecosystem have similar goals when it 
comes to impact, such as community organizations who want to see their community achieve land 
ownership, receive service provision, and rise out of poverty. Public agencies have this goal as 
well, and there are policies aimed to alleviate these issues embedded into national legislation and 
municipal urban plans.  
Furthermore, private landowners may be motivated by economic concerns regarding their 
inability to sell or use their property without removing the current occupants. They may not 
prioritize the well-being of the residents or have an ultimate goal of achieving poverty alleviation 
for these residents; however, their economic goals and motivations can nevertheless reinforce the 
poverty alleviation and other social impact goals of the other players involved. The economic goals 
of private landowners can reinforce the social impact goals of other partners because it incentivizes 
this group to cooperate and work towards the ultimate goal that all parties share: to settle the land 
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dispute. The issue lies in that these public, private, and community entities operate independently, 
there is no mechanism to align their goals and methods for achieving them. 
This lack of collaboration corresponds with Dr. London’s thoughts where he notes how in 
situations outside of social enterprises, say in roles of corporate social responsibility or government 
programs, partners place a greater emphasis on independence and receiving short-term, project-
based returns.85 We see the same dynamics play out with Brazil’s “box model” of governance, 
which will be detailed in the following section, where landowners file a complaint with the 
municipal authorities, who must then separately initiate the eviction process through the judicial 
system, and the landowner additionally has to contract an advisory company to help generate an 
“urban project” to show how the land will be used after the eviction process. Meanwhile the 
occupants themselves are often excluded from the proceedings due to socioeconomic and physical 
barriers to participation.  
This process involves several independent transactions between the private and public 
sector, with the community often left out entirely, despite the fact that all parties involved have the 
same ultimate goal: to settle the land dispute. In this process one actor can succeed, but that success 
might be quite costly. The example above represents one such version, where landowners may 
succeed in recovering their land, while residents face a violent and disruptive eviction process. 
Collaborative interdependence recognizes the interrelationship between these actors and works to 
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes that entail lower costs for all involved by agreeing on 
metrics and indicators of success. In this case, these aligning metrics involves settling on a land 
price and payment schedule that satisfies residents, landowners, public authorities, and Terra 
Nova. 
 
85 London, “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 171 
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I will now move on to another subsection of the theory which states: “working together 
can create new strategies and capabilities that generate value that neither party could create alone.” 
“Value” in this sense depends on the view of the stakeholder, and can encompass economic, social, 
or environmental gains. Terra Nova functions to help aggregate value, and its collaborations lead 
to a complete social transformation for informal communities. 
For example, in partnering with the Paraná State Housing Company COHAPAR, Terra 
Nova helped save the city R$30 million in costs that would have been spent through large scale 
eviction or other forms of expropriation.86 Furthermore, the company estimates that for the first 
20,000 families served by Terra Nova, their property regularization transformed $252 million of 
dead assets into capital.87 This figure represents the value of the regularized land, but through 
payments for the land enabled by Terra Nova, both residents and landowners receive some of this 
economic capital. Once the land is under the name of the resident, they experience an increase in 
wealth based on the property value. Furthermore, landowners are compensated for the value of the 
land through installment payments, and the residents eventually make tax payments on the 
property, which benefits public agencies. 
Without practicing elements of collaborative interdependence, the state government pays 
millions of dollars for costs to remove and relocate residents, the landowner finds themselves 
forced to pay for the formulation of an “urban project,” residents are forced from their land, and 
value is more typically lost in the form of social and economic capital. Terra Nova helps aggregate 
value in all steps of the process by creating an environment for these different groups to collaborate 
and operate as a sequential, organized unit. 
 
86 Battilana et. al., “Terra Nova,” 4 
87 Ashoka, “Sustainable Land Regularization,” Accessed April 17th, 2021 
48 
The final component of this theory states: “achieving this mutual value creation will require 
sharing and integrating skills, knowledge, values, and perspectives,” which Terra Nova does 
through its Cooperation Agreements and Technical Chambers. Beginning with the Technical 
Chamber, Terra Nova forms a group composed of representatives from their own team, residents, 
officials from City Hall, and other partners depending on the location and needs of the community. 
For example, in the case of Vila Marinho in Paraná, the team also included representatives from 
the State Housing Company COHAPAR.88  
The Technical Chamber is an ad hoc body that is not implemented in every case, but rather 
ones that face specialized issues. Specialized issues in this case refer to the need to relocate some 
residents where physical upgrading proves impossible or poses too great of an environmental risk. 
Referring back to the case in Vila Marinho, the Technical Chamber became a major reference in 
the community, as everyone involved had daily contact with the residents so they could ask 
questions and stay informed about the stage of the process.89 In this case, the Technical Chamber 
served as a strong component of project transparency in the community. This group also held 
public meetings to help inform residents, and by bringing groups together for meetings and 
discussions over important decisions involved in finalizing the regularization agreements, Terra 
Nova helps facilitate a dialogue between groups of completely different backgrounds and 
perspectives.  
Another crucial instrument of collaborative interdependence that Terra Nova utilizes 
involves a Cooperation Agreement. The process of creating this agreement involves Terra Nova 
in a position to facilitate negotiations that result in a proposal to submit to the court for ratification. 
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All parties can contribute to establishing the value of the land, the payment schedule, and the 
specific needs of the community in regard to public service provision. Terra Nova originally 
attempted to bring landowners and residents together physically to create these agreements, but 
found that in many cases, landlords and residents cannot meet due to long standing tensions.90 The 
strong tensions create a significant barrier to the residents participation in the regularization 
process, and also demonstrate the need for an entity promoting collaborative interdependence. The 
Terra Nova negotiation dynamics provide contrast with the disjointed process detailed previously, 
which often led to violent or otherwise traumatic removals of the residents, and an outcome where 
not all stakeholders benefited. 
Another concrete example of the significance of the Cooperation Agreements is that they 
provide an opportunity for groups to decide how to allocate money raised for the community fund. 
The community fund pools a percentage of residents’ installment payments. A core element of 
collaborative interdependence entails developing a deep understanding of what type of value is 
created, how much of each type is created, and how that value is allocated.91 Here, we see how 
Terra Nova’s methodology aligns with the theory of collaborative interdependence with the 
allocation of value. In this case, the value is the money in the community fund, which can also be 
then translated into social value based on how the team chooses to use the money. In this case, the 
team mainly involves community members, who first propose a community project to Terra Nova. 
One example includes the proposal for a community center, or daycare, where the residents decide 
what they need most, and Terra Nova helps facilitate the implementation with other partners upon 
approval of the community’s proposal.    
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Building upon this discussion, I will discuss how collaborative interdependence can apply 
to relationships with governments, specifically in Brazil, to help overcome the bureaucracy 
generated by a “box model” of government. 
 
3.3 Box Model of Government 
The process of urbanization is accompanied by demographic changes, increase in 
industrialization and technology use, as well as an increase in fragmentation of interests from a 
growing population, leading to an overall more complex society. Brazilian governments have 
increasingly managed this complexity using a “box model,” which refers to the division of 
Ministries and Secretaries, as well as State and Municipal bodies, into different units for 
“education,” “health,” “social assistance,” “housing,” etc.92 In many ways, this fragmentation has 
been helpful in creating government bodies with specialized services, which leads to a clearer form 
of budget allocation and implementation. Furthermore, while many social issues transcend 
multiple sectors of society, creating an agency for different facets of the issue allows for a 
specialized approach to a problem. However, this fragmentation also leads to increased 
independence and bureaucracy in managing each of these issues.93 By dividing cross-sectoral 
issues into various agencies, there arises a greater burden upon these agencies to communicate and 
coordinate with each other, which conflicts with their compartmentalized nature. 
Terra Nova founder Daniel Albuquerque experienced these divisions first-hand, as he 
describes the process for regularization prior to Terra Nova’s intervention:  
“Say you go knocking on the door of the public authority and ask, ‘I want the sanitation of 
my street.’ When they received this demand from the communities, before Terra Nova, 
they tried to solve all these problems in their own way with their own resources, but never 
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managed to. There’s the public authorities, Urban Planning Secretariat, that takes care of 
urban issues, Environmental Secretariat that takes care of environmental issues, Social 
Secretariat that takes care of socio-economic evaluation of these records, so it is a 
procedure that goes through the government that then is no longer a Municipal body but 
rather a state body. Also, internally this project goes through state licensing in order to then 
reach the registry to open their registration. And where are the residents? This is a years-
long process.”94 
 
This long-winded explanation illustrates the layers of bureaucracy that plague the regularization 
process due to a “box model” of governance, and it also identifies the exclusion of residents from 
the system.  
Social enterprises, according to Fernando Burgos, offer a solution to inefficiencies 
generated in the “box model,” primarily in that they can take a more “population based 
approach.”95 Burgos notes that public administration in Brazil could better serve specific subsets 
of the population, which in this case includes those living in favelas, through a “transversal, 
intersectoral, and intersectional” approach that involves dialogue with companies and NGOs. 
Burgos goes on to suggest that social enterprises can represent a solution for Brazilian 
governments in attempting to take these cross-sectoral approaches. While Burgos does not 
reference the “collaborative interdependence” theory specifically, he begins to speak to areas of 
the theory in mentioning the importance of focusing on intersectoral and intersectional actions and 
policies.  
In building upon the idea that social enterprises can help solve public policy issues in 
Brazil, Marcelo Z. Coelho discusses the importance of forging relationships with different 
stakeholders. More specifically, Coelho discusses how entrepreneurship can encourage 
relationship building that can reduce bureaucracy and create a more efficient solution to a social 
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problem, while continuously prioritizing that population primarily meant to receive these 
impacts.96 This statement speaks to the theory of collaborative interdependence in “working 
collectively to share a new way of thinking.” As previously mentioned, the theory of collaborative 
interdependence requires “sharing and integrating skills, knowledge, values, and perspectives” to 
achieve mutual value creation and aggregate value in an efficient way, which Terra Nova 
implements through the Cooperation Agreements and the ad hoc Technical Chamber. These 
statements reflect similar ideas, showing how the theory coincides with the Brazilian context of 
social entrepreneurship and the government’s “box model.” 
Coelho also contrasts social enterprises’ approach with that of traditional for-profit 
companies, particularly in regard to these companies’ incentives based on competitive advantage. 
Specifically, Coelho states: “It’s not about thinking about relationships just as a way of 
guaranteeing competitive advantages... If we fall into this enticing trap, the impact business will 
follow the logic of competition fostered by the traditional national capitalism market.” Here, 
Coelho speaks to the importance of approaching relationships with a mindset not rooted in the 
notion of “what can you do for me,” but rather, “what can we continue to do for one another?” The 
first question lends itself to a one-way interaction, where one party offers a service to another. The 
second question lends itself to an interdependent relationship where both parties give and receive 
benefits that simulate their individual success by overlapping their interests and efforts, and this 
question serves as the core of collaborative interdependence.  
I will continue this discussion in the following section where I discuss social enterprises’ 




collaborative interdependence in ways not satisfied by traditional investors, or donor-dependent 
nonprofits. 
 
3.4 Impact Investor Relationships 
Social enterprises like Terra Nova are incentivized to build relationships with “impact 
investors'' because these investors similarly hold goals of both social and economic returns. I argue 
that relationships with these investors are modeled upon collaborative interdependence and can 
help concentrate resources to address the issue of informal settlements in a way that cannot be 
satisfied by donor-dependent nonprofits or traditional for-profit companies. Terra Nova founder 
André Albuquerque summarizes my claim well in explaining his choice to establish Terra Nova 
as a for-profit company: “I created Terra Nova as a business because when social change is a 
business – and a profitable one – a lot more external resources can be gathered than in philanthropy. 
People realize that by investing resources they can both act for good and get fair returns on their 
investment.”97  
Exploring this point about philanthropy, we can contrast the support provided by investors 
with nonprofit donations. Nonprofits represent entities that are organized and operated for a 
collective, public or social benefit, in contrast with an entity that operates as a business aiming to 
generate a profit for its owners.98 Since the primary goals of the nonprofit lie in the social realm 
and typically avoid a market-based approach, or at least one that results in taxation from the federal 
government, they often become reliant upon donor support. I argue that this reliance on 
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philanthropy creates a relationship based on dependence as opposed to interdependence. While 
donors and nonprofits may share similar goals, the success of the donor does not depend on the 
success of the nonprofit in the same way that an investor does, partly because of the flow of 
resources.  
Typically, a non-profit donor provides financial capital and expects a social benefit, while 
for an investor, she provides financial capital and expects financial capital in return. In addition, 
the social benefits generated by a nonprofit do not physically affect the donor in terms of a tangible 
benefit other than psychological improvements brought on by the altruistic act of donating, or 
perhaps increased social standing. This distinction may seem oversimplified, as nonprofits can 
take a vast variety of different forms, and donors can take on a variety of roles and offer multiple 
motivations and expectations for their donations. However, my goal is to compare the flow of a 
transient philanthropic donation to that of a for-profit investor who expects financial returns. We 
can view this simplified stream of investment in Figure 3.1 below, which shows a one-way 
distribution of resources from the donor that theoretically leads to the BoP.  
 
Figure 3.1: Flow of donor-dependent resources and returns 
The figure includes different colors to show the different entities involved and the 
conversion of financial capital into social benefit. The one-way arrow indicates that the returns 
end with the BoP, so the donor’s involvement theoretically begins and ends with their contribution.  
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Another way to view these donations involves the “floor,” or the likely minimum impact 
generated, and the “ceiling,” or potential maximum of their impacts. The ceiling for donor-led 
initiatives involves factors including dedicated funds for investment, a commitment to certain 
social goals or activities, and a focus on transferring resources.99 Synthesizing these factors, the 
potential impact of donor-led initiatives lies in the resources they provide up-front, and their 
commitment to a specific agreement regarding the allocation of these resources. However, the 
“floor” or limits imposed by donor-led initiatives involves a capped level of investment, the 
inclination towards short-term projects with a planned exit, and measuring success based on the 
delivery of services. In synthesizing these limits, the major takeaway lies in the donor’s short-term 
relationship with the project.  
Researchers contrast these short-term contributions with the need for long-term innovation, 
and indicate that when nonprofit organizations increasingly rely on donations from external private 
sources of funding, long-term innovation declines.100 Social efforts targeting the Base of the 
Pyramid population require long-term innovation because the social returns an entity or donor 
hopes to generate, such as poverty alleviation, improvements in health, or in this case, large-scale 
slum upgrading, accrue in the long-term by nature. Therefore, nonprofits looking to address social 
issues faced by the Base of the Pyramid must consider long-term innovation necessary, while 
facing constraints due to transient donor relationships.  
Conversely, traditional for-profit companies operate with a primary goal to generate 
financial returns for their owners and investors. These expectations create an interdependent 
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relationship between partners, where the success of the company relies on financial stimulation 
from an investor, meanwhile the investor benefits from subsequent financial returns, as illustrated 
by Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2: Flow of For-profit company resources and returns 
The lines in the figure connecting each entity to the financial capital, coupled with the two-
way arrow, shows that the flow of financial capital goes back and forth between investor and 
company. Furthermore, the figure represents features of collaborative interdependence, where the 
investor and company’s goals overlap, as shown by the common metric, while the two-way arrow 
indicates a reinforcement of these goals between the two entities. 
However, the focus on financial gain lends itself to transient interactions similar to those 
of nonprofits and donors, where investors often prefer short-term gains because it minimizes risks 
and serves as a clear-cut measure of success that justifies their investment.101 This prioritization of 
short-term financial gains does not align with the needs of the BoP because of the long-term nature 
of the issues they face, and it also does not leave room for a prioritization of social impacts. The 
figure demonstrates this point by failing to involve the BoP anywhere in the flow. 
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Social enterprises serve as a happy medium between nonprofit and traditional for-profit 
companies, where the company synthesizes both social and economic returns, while seeking 
investors that also maintain the same priorities. The term “impact investors “characterizes these 
investors who seek both financial and social gain, and figure 3.3 demonstrates the flow of resources 
in these relationships. 
 
Figure 3.3: Flow of Social enterprise resources and returns 
Figure 3.3 includes a two way arrow to show an overall back and forth flow of resources, 
while the individual arrows further detail the components of this flow, which notably include the 
impact investor, the social enterprise, and the BoP, similar to the nonprofit flow in Figure 3.1, 
while including financial returns that make their way from the investor, through the social 
enterprise, to the BoP, and then reversed back from the BoP to the company and subsequently the 
investor. Clearly, this flow appears more complex, and we see the financial returns depend on the 
social benefit generated for the BoP. While not all social enterprises exhibit this form, where the 
company profits from the BoP, I am using this model because Terra Nova’s takes this approach to 
generating financial returns by facilitating micro crediting payment plans with the BoP that include 
fees for Terra Nova’s services. 
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This flow illustrates the long-term nature of these investments, as they depend on social 
returns that correspond to the long-term social issues at hand. The model also illustrates how social 
enterprises concentrate financial resources to the issue of informal settlements by involving impact 
investors that share mutual, interdependent goals of social and financial returns. Furthermore, we 
see aspects of collaborative interdependence similar to those in the for-profit flow, where the two-
way arrow indicates mutual value creation through financial capital. Contrasting the for-profit 
flow, the more complex web of interactions in Figure 3.3 helps demonstrate the aggregation of 
value that takes place in bringing these groups together, where social and economic benefits are 
shared by all parties.  
Terra Nova exemplifies a similar flow through its relationship with its principal investor, 
MOV Investimentos, an impact investment firm based in São Paulo, Brazil. MOV Investimentos 
has invested an upwards of R$11 million in Terra Nova since 2013 and holds a portfolio of 
investments that seek to address socioenvironmental issues, primarily in Brazil. Now, one of 
MOV’s principal investors sits on Terra Nova’s executive board, demonstrating how the company 
invests human capital as well as financial capital into the flow of resources. Furthermore, the 
company contributes knowledge capital in the form of business best-practices, for example, in 
helping Terra Nova establish a minimum payment price and refinancing plan, as well as an “impact 
thesis” to direct their social impact goals.102  
While investors in traditional for-profit companies may similarly contribute human and 
knowledge capital, the fact remains that these companies do not prioritize social impacts as do 
social enterprises, so these resources, instead of being concentrated in the company solely for the 
purpose of generating profit, are applied to a social issue that both the investor and company seek 
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to solve. Again, we see a compounding of goals and an aggregation of value as described in the 
theory of collaborative interdependence, further detailed by Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4: Flow of social enterprise resources and returns 
The figure shows how human and knowledge capital do not necessarily flow like financial 
capital, but rather they are concentrated within the social enterprise that can apply these resources 
to their services and offer them to the BoP. Here, we see concepts arise that apply to the PEF 
framework in the following chapter, where I examine how Terra Nova’s incentives as a social 
enterprise to build financial, knowledge, and human capital lead to the formation of their 
partnership with MOV. 
So far, I have discussed how social enterprises like Terra Nova can offer an approach of 
collaborative interdependence to partnerships with governments and impact investors, and now I 
will discuss the most important relationship in the process: the company’s relationship with the 
communities they seek to serve. 
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3.4 Relationships Building with Residents 
I will begin the discussion about Terra Nova’s interactions with residents by referring back 
to Coelho’s point, which states: “Promoting impact from the perspective of entrepreneurship 
means working [...] with the most vulnerable populations and putting this whole system together 
at their service.” Coelho goes on to say, “Building community relationships, therefore, is one of 
the starting points'' of any strategy for a social impact-oriented business. With this starting point 
in mind, I will discuss how Terra Nova exemplifies this resident-oriented treatment through an 
approach of collaborative interdependence, and how their relationships with residents helps 
overcome barriers to participation in the regularization system.  
Slum dwellers face a paradox, where their immediate needs involve public services, such 
as access to water, sanitation, electricity, infrastructure etc., yet these needs cannot be met by 
public authorities in Brazil without legal title to the land. This paradox represents the first barrier 
to residents, especially when compounded by their limited income, for when prioritizing how to 
spend their money, residents may choose to fund superficial improvements to their living 
environment or informal rent payments before pursuing legal action to obtain the property title. 
Some researchers argue that residents choose not to invest in their land without ownership because 
they will not be directly benefiting from an increase in land value. However, case study research 
from favelas in Recife, Brazil concludes that residents prove willing to invest in their housing 
conditions irrespective of their legal status due to the complex perceptions residents hold regarding 
land tenure.103  
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This paradox reflects general trends for those living in the BoP, where many of the issues 
that this population group faces require long-term solutions, yet their short-term needs and low 
income constrain their decision making. For example, a resident may be more willing to pay for 
infrastructure repairs from a fellow resident or another member of the informal economy instead 
of saving up money to purchase the land title with the hopes of receiving public services from the 
state.  
Furthermore, living in an informal environment can lead to a lack of instruments for 
participation in the formal economy. In many cases, residents of informal settlements purchase 
their land from an informal occupant. This leads to a lower price, nearly half the value of a property 
with title,104 making it more affordable for residents of the BoP to occupy. However, this informal 
transaction also leads to exclusion from the formal system due to a lack of legal documentation 
proving the residents’ ownership, as well as the absence of a registered address. The lack of these 
formal instruments presents barriers to participation in the judicial system, for as mentioned in the 
introduction, without a formal address, residents cannot receive notices from the court, nor 
correspondence from the bank or other public authorities.  
These barriers can be multiplied across informal settlement communities, and looked at 
through a lens of “Tragedy of the Common Good.”105 Even if one household were able to 
overcome barriers to achieve land title of their lot, public authorities will not come to the 
community and provide services like a sewer system, electricity grid, and pave new roads for a 
single household. These services are typically supplied on a larger scale, where the whole 
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community benefits. So, without participation from the entire community, the whole process 
proves virtually impossible for individual residents’ participation. 
Terra Nova takes steps to address all of these barriers through their relationship building 
with residents. Beginning with efforts to introduce formality into the community, Terra Nova 
builds relationships with community leaders to help identify or establish Resident Associations 
and secure their legal bylaws so they can represent their community in the judicial agreement. In 
an interview with Harvard researchers, André Albuquerque notes that the company has “spent a 
lot of time advising local leaders to organize meetings and voting sessions, update documents and 
accounts” in efforts to “create strong connections with communities and to rally them around a 
transformation goal.”106 Terra Nova even encourages a greater dialogue between these 
communities and public authorities by helping them organize protests and contact the press in 
order to encourage public authorities to take action in the regularization process.107 
Here, Terra Nova not only helps introduce formality through Resident Association bylaws, 
but they also address the large-scale nature of the issue by involving the community as a whole 
and taking time to help organize the community. Terra Nova does not charge an upfront fee for 
the advising services they provide to community members, yet these services and efforts to build 
community relationships require investment from the company in the form of time and energy, or 
what Daniel Albuquerque refers to as, “patience and resilience.”108  
Terra Nova’s community-wide approach does not come without difficulty. For example, 
in 2006 Terra Nova worked with a community called Vila Marinho in Paranáguá, Paraná, and 
faced resistance from 15 families who protested the agreements because it involved significant 
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alterations to their properties by public service providers.109 These families physically occupied 
the streets to prevent the installation of light networks, water and sewage. At this point in the 
process, public authorities had been involved to help construct the urban project, and the families 
had to be legally notified and summoned by the bailiff to demolish their homes. 
Terra Nova sought to resolve this conflict, and employed the Technical Chamber, one of 
its major instruments of collaborative interdependence, to undertake this task. By involving 
community leaders, concerned residents, and public agencies involved in the service 
implementation within this Chamber, Terra Nova helped facilitate a dialogue which led to a 
peaceful resolution, in which the group found a way for residents to adapt their properties to the 
urban project without requiring demolition.110  
This example illustrates one of the barriers to the regularization process, where the services 
involve the entire community and require full participation. Without full participation, individual 
residents cannot benefit, and Terra Nova’s intervention helps overcome this “tragedy of the 
common good” by ensuring all residents participate using an instrument of collaborative 
interdependence.  
Furthermore, as a part of Terra Nova’s methodology, André Albuquerque writes about how 
socioenvironmental work permeates the entire process, and can include activities such as “home 
visits, seminars and workshops.” These workshops and seminars are geared towards educating the 
community about the benefits of land ownership and service provision, and also helps teach skills 
such as construction and property maintenance. These activities help ensure residents’ cooperation 
and also increase their sense of agency and ownership over the transformation process. 
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Furthermore, these activities can address the previous discussion about residents’ perceptions of 
land tenure and predisposition to the informal economy by explaining the value of entering into a 
long-standing judicial agreement and payment process to achieve land ownership.  
Another instrument for resident interaction and collaborative interdependence lie in Terra 
Nova’s Community Agents: a subset of Terra Nova’s team who works with a specific community 
in identifying their needs, helping with social and environmental work, and collecting the 
installment payments from the owner.111 These agents help identify the services the community 
wants to prioritize when generating an agreement with public service providers. Furthermore, by 
collecting payments, these agents help overcome barriers like a lack of mail or direct access to 
banking and payment systems.  
In coordinating the needs of residents with different public service providers, community 
agents serve to aggregate value in the spirit of collaborative interdependence by facilitating an 
efficient agreement where the city saves time and money by focusing on the services that would 
most benefit the community instead of wasting time implementing services that they assume the 
community may want. Also, by collecting payments, the company serves as a bridge between 
residents and the landowner, helping residents achieve their goals of land ownership, while helping 
landowners receive compensation for their property. 
Furthermore, Terra Nova helps overcome issues of low income with their flexibility in 
receiving payments from residents. Daniel Albuquerque comments on the company’s distinction 
as a social enterprise from that of a strictly for-profit company by saying: “at the time that the 
resident has a payment difficulty, if we weren't very social, say if we looked like a real estate 
developer that sells lots, we would have already started a process of removing residents to sell for 
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the next one. Because there are families, we get involved with each one of them to find a solution, 
so we have a treatment at the end that is totally focused on looking at the side of the residents.”  
The scenario Daniel presents allows us to picture an alternative, where traditional real 
estate companies enter into these communities attempting an expropriation of ownership on behalf 
of the landowner. Due to the hypothetical company’s prioritization of profit, a greater potential 
arises for eviction of the current residents if they choose not to participate in the agreement or 
cannot comply with the stricter financial expectations of a traditional for-profit company. The 
flexibility that Terra Nova demonstrates in working with these communities helps distinguish their 
identity as a social enterprise from a traditional for-profit company, and helps residents overcome 
their income-based constraints.  
Daniel offers further insights about Terra Nova’s approach, stating: “if it was only for 
money, we would choose something easier to do so, because the residents have many difficulties. 
We go beyond what a [traditional for-profit] company has to do by having the patience to invest 
up front and arrive at a solution reached over several years of payments.” This quote helps illustrate 
that Terra Nova’s interactions with residents require heavy upfront investments, as well as 
flexibility in receiving returns, and I argue that their identity as a social enterprise incentivizes 
these investments and flexibility in ways that create a unique partnership with residents. This 
partnership, supported by an approach of collaborative interdependence, helps residents overcome 
barriers to participation in the formal property system.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the theory of collaborative interdependence and how this theory can 
be applied to relationships with governments, impact investors, and residents. Furthermore, this 
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chapter applied the theory of collaborative interdependence to the issue of land regularization to 
show how this approach proves necessary in coordinating a cross-sectoral approach leading to a 
complete social transformation for these communities.   
The chapter specifically describes issues presented by the “box model” of governance in 
Brazil and explains how an approach of collaborative interdependence by social enterprises like 
Terra Nova helps overcome issues caused by the fragmentation and poor coordination of public 
agencies. This chapter also provides a discussion regarding the flow of resources between an 
enterprise and an impact investor in contrast with that of a for-profit company and a donor-
dependent non-profit. Lastly, I discussed how collaborative interdependence contributes to long-
standing, interactive relationships with residents that help them overcome barriers to participation 













Chapter IV: Partnership Ecosystem Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will use Dr. London’s Partnerships Ecosystem Framework (PEF) to 
identify and categorize Terra Nova’s partners and create a discussion around their relationship 
with these partners. Specifically, I will outline Terra Nova’s methodology and chronological 
processes to explain the need for these different partners and the ways in which Terra Nova 
interacts with them. Then, I will systematically go through the PEF to talk about how different 
partners help satisfy the different areas of the framework.  
First, I will discuss how Terra Nova categorizes its partners and introduce figures that help 
to visualize the partnerships. Then I will describe the different phases Terra Nova undertakes in 
conducting a large-scale regularization project. In this section I will begin to synthesize the 
partnership relationships that we see arise within Terra Nova’s methodological processes to help 
introduce these ideas before they are applied using the PEF. When using the PEF, I will reference 
different phases of Terra Nova’s methodology that I previously described and build on the 
discussion I started in that section by describing Terra Nova’ s methods in the context of the 
framework.  
 
4.2 Background Information 
In a publication about Terra Nova’s methodology, founder André Albuquerque categorizes 
Terra Nova’s partners as follows: “a) Private Sector: Land Owners and NGOs b) Community: 
residents, Association of Residents, Women's groups, etc. c) Public Power: Executive - State, 
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Municipal and Federal, Judiciary, Public Ministry, Legislative d) Registry Offices. e) Financial 
and International Cooperation Institutions.”112  
I have created Table 1 to provide more specificity regarding the entities included in these 
broad categories, though “specificity” looks different for each one. Beginning with the Private 
Sector, I have renamed this sector “Private/NGO sector” to include organizations that do not neatly 
fall under the other categories. Here I have broadly identified “landowners,” while specifically 
identifying two partners, SENAI and GLA, who I will reference during the discussion of the PEF. 
For the Community category, these partners are labeled broadly because they involve many 
location-specific entities. These location-specific entities can then be condensed into common 
groups present across these different locations, like residents, and Resident Associations. Instead 
of naming individual Resident Associations within the thirty communities Terra Nova has worked 
with, I will use this umbrella term throughout the discussion. Women’s groups serve as an ad hoc 
example of a community organization that may or may not be present in different locations, and I 
included it in the table primarily because Albuquerque mentioned these groups specifically in his 
categorization of their partnerships. 
The Public Power includes a wide range of government agencies that Terra Nova may or 
may not encounter, depending on their location and the needs of the specific community. The sheer 
number of agencies involved helps illustrate the “box model” mentioned in Chapter 3, where we 
see agencies involved in housing, finance, environmental regulation, court systems, and legislative 
bodies. Furthermore, many of these organizations vary state by state, and some concentrate in the 
municipal level as well, such as State and Municipal Secretaries of Housing. In the following 
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Table 1: Organization and Specification Terra Nova’s Partners 
Private/NGO 
Sector 




Landowners Residents Ministry of Cities 
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discussion I will refer to this sector broadly as public power, governments, or public agencies, 
depending on the context of the discussion.  
The Registry Offices category also helps illustrate a complex box model due to the number 
of different agencies involved. These Registry Offices can be considered a “public power;” 
however, they play very different roles in the process, and separating these groups can help create 
a more nuanced discussion. Registry Offices help provide housing data in the beginning of Terra 
Nova’s intervention, and also require that Terra Nova registers these properties with the 
appropriate agencies after receiving legal title. The number of agencies involved creates issues in 
determining a condensed source of property information, and I will use this sector to discuss the 
Institutional Infrastructure portion of the PEF.  
In the “Financial and International Cooperation Institutions” category, there are a few core 
partners that can be readily identified and researched to fully understand their specific 
contributions to Terra Nova and the PEF, namely the Ashoka Changemakers Network, and the 
Schwab Foundation. I will primarily focus on these partners when discussing the “Enhance 
Enterprise Resources” quadrant of the framework. 
Now that I have identified the major partners Terra Nova interacts with, I will refer to these 
groups more broadly in discussing Terra Nova’s methodology. I will also introduce specific 
examples of partners in these broad categories when discussing the PEF. 
Figure 4.1 gives a broad overview of Terra Nova’s methodology. Here we see the process 
is initiated by either the community (“population”), public power, or landowner as shown on the 
left of the figure by the different colored boxes leading to Terra Nova. The arrow to the blue box 
then reflects that Terra Nova conducts a feasibility study. The downward lining running through 
the study and the green box indicates that Terra Nova, along with public agencies, begins socio 
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environmental work. The line runs parallel to the processes on the right, indicating that this social 
environmental work permeates the whole process. This socio environmental work broadly means 
that the company takes steps to prioritize the social and environmental wellbeing of the settlement 
through research and collaborative planning with residents.113  
After the feasibility study comes the diagnostic phase, which involves the beginning stages 
of setting up a payment plan for residents based on the findings in the feasibility study. Then the 
next step involves the development of an urban project, as illustrated by the arrows flowing left to  
 
Figure 4.1 Terra Nova’s Procedural Flow114 
right. At this point Terra Nova works to finalize a judicial agreement between the residents, 
landowners, and public partners in the local court system. The confirmation of the judicial contract 
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ratifies the payment plan so residents can begin financing their ownership. This process is 
represented in the figure where the “judicial agreement” leads to the payment “contracts,” which 
then reaches the company’s receivable portfolio. Meanwhile the “approval” of the urban project 
leads to public service provision, labeled in the figure as “revitalization.” The project is sometimes 
maintained through the Conduct Adjustment Agreement (TAC), a legal mechanism that enforces 
the implementation of public services from the government in particularly environmentally 
sensitive areas.115 The dashed line around the box indicates its ad hoc implementation, while the 
line connecting it to the social and environmental work shows how this mechanism is used to 
enforce this work by the government. Moving forward I will further detail each step in the process 
that I have identified using this figure. 
 
4.3 Terra Nova Methodology 
Beginning with the first step with the company being contracted by either the public 
power, the landowner, or the community to pursue the regularization process, one can see 
partnership dynamics begin to form, where one stakeholder activates the process through which 
Terra Nova must involve the other stakeholders. For example, if the landowner contacts Terra 
Nova, then Terra Nova must pursue action to involve the residents and a public agency as a part 
of their services. This initial step transforms stakeholders into partners who must work together 
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Next, Terra Nova undertakes a feasibility study, which involves an evaluation of an area’s 
characteristics in a multitude of sectors, including the legal parameters, environmental conditions, 
and other location-specific circumstances.116 Specifically, the feasibility study works to develop 
negotiation parameters with the landowner, and includes activities such as verification of 
ownership, liens, and fiscal obligations of the property. Furthermore, the study involves the 
community by identifying community organizations and their leadership. Here, we see another 
indication of a partnership forming, where Terra Nova begins to build a direct relationship with 
community groups. Lastly, the study involves an environmental inquiry into the land to determine 
any potential risks or sensitive areas that could pose a threat to permanent settlement. This stage 
also involves the confirmation for the Regularization Contract between Terra Nova and 
landowners, constituting an official agreement and grounds for partnership.117  
Other partnerships begin to emerge during this process, including those with public powers 
who may have special requests for the feasibility study, as well as other technical bodies 
responsible for undertaking environmental assessments. These relationships extend beyond the 




In the next part of the process, Terra Nova undergoes a “Diagnostic” stage, which involves 
a more in-depth assessment of each household to study aspects of the land, understand elements 
of their socio-economic status, such as their income, education, size of the family, etc. This stage 
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builds upon the general findings and negotiations with landowners in the feasibility study to work 
with community members to determine an appropriate payment schedule. Another element to this 
field work involves Terra Nova training community leaders to partake in the regularization 
process. Furthermore, Terra Nova offers educational opportunities referred to as “community 
sensibilization” to educate community members about their services while identifying the benefits 
of formal property rights. These education efforts help motivate and engage the community, while 
helping to secure the enrollment necessary for undertaking the project.118  
Overall, this phase helps generate an evaluation based on the social, urban, and legal 
environment and the community’s specific needs to negotiate with community leaders, 
landowners, and public power such as the municipal government. During the diagnostic phase 
Terra Nova completes the official agreement between landowners, residents, and municipalities 
that sets the value for the land, as well as the government’s commitment to provide community-
specific public services such as infrastructure improvements, roads, water provision and sanitation, 
etc.119  
Lastly, the diagnostic stage establishes what I will refer to as a “Multi-Stakeholder 
Council,” including municipal and state government officials, landowners, and community 
leadership, with a goal of facilitating negotiations and representation of all partners. I am 
introducing this as an umbrella term because these councils have taken different forms over time. 
Daniel recalls in their first few years of operation, Terra Nova attempted to bring groups together 
physically for discussions, but the tensions between the landowners and occupants were at times 




120 D. Albuquerque, “Interview with Daniel Albuquerque,” 2021 
75 
does not hold traditional “council meetings,” but they can still be considered a part of a “council” 
that helps make decisions in the regularization process. These decisions include the setting 
priorities for “urban projects,” which is the technical proposal for transferring ownership and 
physically upgrading the land.  
A subgroup within this larger stakeholder council involves residents, typically those 
considered community leaders, determining how to allocate money from the Community Fund, an 
account set up for the community by Terra Nova using a percentage of the housing payments made 
by residents. Terra Nova then approves and helps to implement the project by coordinating partners 
in the public agencies. Another form of multi-stakeholder council is referred to as the “Technical 
Chamber,” which most notably involves technical government bodies involved in the environment 
and urban planning divisions. This committee arises to address location-specific issues that involve 
assisting or relocating families, or those that require expertise in operating in environmentally 
sensitive areas.121 
Though it has taken on different forms and varies based on the community and its needs, 
the Multi-Stakeholder Council, involves the private sector (landowners,) community 
organizations, and government bodies. The Council exemplifies my argument, where Terra Nova, 
in pursuing activities incentivized by their role as a social enterprise in gathering Market 
Intelligence, Market Access, Improving Infrastructure, etc., brings together and manages an 
ecosystem of partners. A multi-stakeholder council is a major instrument of Terra Nova’s 
methodology, and it shows how an entity like Terra Nova can function to manage councils like 
these, which did not exist prior to the company’s intervention.  
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Judicial Agreement 
Terra Nova then pursues an official judicial agreement which finalizes the conditions for 
each individual resident in regard to the price, term, and conditions of payment, in accordance with 
the Indemnity Instrument called the Contract of Adherence to Land Regularization. While the 
judiciary may not seem like a conventional partner in the sense of a forged agreement between the 
two, Terra Nova founder André Albuquerque was originally required to explain that his 
methodology was in accordance with Article 1,228, §§ 4 and 5 of the Brazilian Civil Code: 
“The owner has the power to use, enjoy and dispose of the land, and the right to recover it from 
the power of whoever unfairly owns or holds it. 
§ 4. The owner can also be deprived of the land if the claimed property consists of a large area, in 
uninterrupted possession and in good faith, for more than five years, of a considerable number of 
people, and these have carried out, together or separately, works on it and services considered by 
the judge of relevant social and economic interest. 
§ 5. In the case of the preceding paragraph, the judge will determine the fair compensation due to 
the owner; Once the price is paid, the sentence will be valid as a title for the registration of the 
property in the name of the owners.”122 
André’s interpretation of these statutes proved unique, where he took these paragraphs to 
mean that a private firm can initiate a judicial repossession of ownership, as long as the owner 
receives payment for the land. By approaching the courts with an agreement already formulated, 
including a payment plan, Terra Nova effectively introduces solved cases to the court, instead of 
requiring additional mediation from a public judge. Terra Nova continues to be the only social 
enterprise facilitating agreements of this nature, and by approving the methodology through the 
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courts the company has established legitimacy and a mutually beneficial relationship between the 
two entities. We can contrast this with past practices where courts often found these cases 
“unsolvable,” when they were brought on by a public agency,123 but by accepting Terra Nova’s 
legal interpretation and working to ratify these multi-party agreements, the judiciary becomes a 
partner as opposed to solely a government body. 
 
Urban Plan  
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Figure 4.2: Example of an Urban Project Jd. Israelense e Arco-Íris, Araucária, PR124 
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Around the time of the initiation for the judicial agreement, as these methodological steps 
can overlap chronologically, Terra Nova helps pursue an Urban Plan. This phase largely has to do 
with the physical layout of the occupation. It includes a topographic survey of the area, registration 
of existing buildings, a geological and geotechnical survey, as basically an elaboration of the 
“urban project” generated prior.125 Figure 4.2 shows an example of an “urban project.” The yellow 
area shows the lot divisions for each individual property, the green indicates areas for 
environmental preservation, and the pink areas show lots that are in different phases of lot 
delineation. Furthermore, the red line indicates the perimeter of the settlement, while the blue line 
indicates water flow.  
 Before Terra Nova’s intervention, the landowner had to pursue the formation of an “urban 
project.” Assigning the responsibility of the “urban project” on the landowner often prevented the 
completion of the process due to the high costs of contracting environmental agencies. These 
projects also took typically four years to receive approval, indicating the inefficiency in the market 
process.  
Terra Nova’s coordination of this process serves as another example of their ability to 
manage an ecosystem of partners by taking over this process and managing the public agencies 
and landowners involved. This process proves particularly important for involving partners 
because it requires approval from the Municipality and appropriate environmental agencies, as 
well as from the appropriate Real Estate Registry offices. Terra Nova must coordinate between 
several different organs, particularly in their efforts to ensure that the homes are not only 
regularized but receive the benefits of regularization that include public service provision, legal 
title, and the financial value that home ownership promises. Project Implementation 
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The implementation stage requires further environmental assessments, particularly for 
areas identified as sensitive in the previous stages, to finalize a plan for revitalization. Depending 
on the public services agreed upon in the judicial agreement projects, public agencies may require 
special approval processes, say, for the installation of roads, sanitation services such as water and 
sewage, etc. Once all partners involved, namely those who make up the Multi-Stakeholder 
Council, agree upon the Urban Project, the revitalization, or the implementation of public services 
can begin.126  
Furthermore, the implementation stage involves Terra Nova opening up a community 
service post to formalize agreements with each household, manage contracts, and receive payment. 
In order to make the payments affordable, Terra Nova sets up a payment plan of small monthly 
installments over a period of 5-10 years. The payments account for Terra Nova’s service fee, the 
landowner’s compensation, while also setting aside a percentage to a Community Fund to benefit 
residents and undertake projects that occur outside the government’s scope.  
This micro-crediting program Terra Nova provides involves a new sphere of partners: 
impact investors. Terra Nova’s payment model requires intensive upfront investment, in building 
relationships with communities, conducting technical assessments of the property, etc., but in the 
long run, when residents' payments accrue, the company profits from the percentage of service fee 
included in the payments.127 As of 2020, nearly 20 years after the company’s founding, Terra Nova 
began to break-even and generate returns on its investments.128 Terra Nova managed to sustain 
itself and finance these transactions with the help from a handful of investors as well as grants, 
awards, and bank loans. 
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Terra Nova’s ability to generate this investment to help finance this policy shows how 
social enterprises are poised to take on an active role in facilitating the regularization process, 
while concentrating resources to the issue of informal settlements through its involvement with an 
impact investor. Moving forward, I will examine Terra Nova using the Partnership Ecosystem 
Framework, and I will categorize the partners that I mentioned going through Terra Nova’s 
methodology, while providing specific examples of these partners. Many of the partners appear in 
more than one section of the framework, which helps illustrate the complex relationships Terra 
Nova manages with its partners. 
Figure 4.3 organizes Terra Nova’s partners by assigning them to different activities 
outlined by the PEF. I will evaluate the framework by quadrant, beginning in the upper left with 
partners that “Facilitate Enterprise Activities,” shown in Figure 4.4. 
 








Figure 4.4 Facilitate Enterprise Activities Quadrant 
The “Facilitate Enterprise Activities” quadrant indicates that social enterprises, in their 
efforts to facilitate their core services, must undertake strategies and seek partners to help generate 
market intelligence. More specifically, market intelligence involves understanding the target 
population’s cultural context, competitive landscape, consumer demand, and supplier preferences. 
Terra Nova’s “Diagnostic Phase” demonstrates these types of activities, and, as previously 
described, this phase involves partnering with residents and Resident Associations to understand 
consumer demand and cultural context.  
 
4.4 Partnership Ecosystem Framework 
Furthermore, Daniel Albuquerque describes contracting private companies and researchers 
to help undertake socioeconomic surveys of the community to provide insight for Terra Nova in 
beginning the project. He mentions difficulties attempting to conduct the surveys internally, and 
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that by hiring these companies they can serve as a “control group to ensure scientific validity.”129 
Here, we see Terra Nova draw from different sources of market information within the same 
community. By partnering with Resident Associations, Terra Nova can assess residents’ interest 
in the project, and through an independent source, they can objectively determine the 
socioeconomic status of the community to help formulate payment schedules and other financial 
aspects of the agreement to make them manageable for residents. 
Terra Nova must also forge partnerships with landowners, as they can be considered the 
supplier in this model. This partnership highlights Terra Nova’s role as an intermediary, where 
they must negotiate between the community and the landowner, gaining market intelligence 
through both sources in regard to the residents' ability to pay, and the landowner’s preference for 
the land price.  
 
Market Access: 
Market access specifies strategies for partnerships that allow for connection to the 
community the enterprise seeks to serve, as well as general implementation support. According to 
London, “Support for market access occurs when the [partner] acts as a catalyst in building 
relationships between the enterprise and a wider distribution network to which that enterprise may 
not have access.”130 In Terra Nova’s case, the distribution network can indicate the relationships 
with the communities they seek to serve, which would indicate a partner such as a Resident 
Association.  
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In a report detailing the company’s methodology and case study information from 
community, Terra Nova founder André Albuquerque noted that, “The population's adhesion to the 
process is directly linked to the degree of organization and strengthening of Resident 
Associations.”131 He then explains how Terra Nova incorporated training of community leaders 
into the process to instill self-management mechanisms past the regularization project.132 More 
specifically, he refers to projects teaching residents about the construction process to help invest 
the community more in the physical improvement that the legal process leads to.  
Furthermore, a Resident Association needs official bylaws to legally represent the community. 
Daniel Albuquerque describes the importance for Terra Nova in helping to establish these bylaws 
because they ensure that the Resident Association can play an active role in the process. The 
company can negotiate an agreement on behalf of the whole community, as opposed to signing 
contracts with individual residents. 
These activities relate to market access by building relationships with communities that 
contribute to implementation support, so when these large-scale agreements are enacted, the 
community is on board and does not display any resistance. In the past, community members have 
attempted to block efforts to gain community consent for the agreement due to misinterpretation 
of Terra Nova’s presence. For example, referring back to the case of Vila Marinho in Paranáguá, 
Paraná, 15 families tried to block market access by preventing public service providers from 
carrying out their upgrading. By negotiating with the families, Terra Nova helped address their 
concerns. This example shows how by building close relationships with the community, Terra 
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Nova can thereby access the entire community as a market, but more importantly, as a unit for 
social transformation.  
My emphasis on the market relates back to the framework and Terra Nova’s incentives to 
create these partnerships with Resident Associations. Daniel describes how embedded in both their 
profit-driven and social impact goals lies the need to facilitate large-scale agreements, so market 
access proves crucial not only for Terra Nova as a social enterprise, but one that operates in the 
informal housing market in pursuing a complete community transformation. 
 
Value Creation: 
For Value Creation, the main goal is to assess poverty impacts, which can constitute a wide 
range from income, wealth, health, well-being, etc. This process relates to Terra Nova’s efforts to 
conduct socio economic surveys before and as a follow-up with residents after the finalization of 
the agreement. The partners involved in helping Terra Nova assess its value creation include MOV 
Investimentos, socioeconomic survey companies, as well as other University researchers. 
MOV helped Terra Nova establish its “impact thesis,” or, the core mission of the company. 
The thesis states that by “dissolving land conflicts, strengthening community associations, and 
giving access to land titles to socially and environmentally vulnerable communities,” it would 
“enhance individual and family security, unlock infrastructure investments, enable better living 
conditions, and boost dwellers’ self-esteem.”133 This thesis helps direct Terra Nova’s value 
creation efforts, and MOV further assists Terra Nova by helping to contract researchers to 
undertake surveys of community members. 
 
133 Battilana et. al., “Terra Nova,” 11 
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Figure 4.5 below shows an example of an unpublished survey conducted by researcher 
Edgard Barki through the Fundação Getulio Vargas, a higher education institution and think tank 
whose mission states: "To stimulate Brazil’s socio-economic development.” The following figure 
helps summarize qualitative research undertaken by a partner organization that facilitates Terra 
Nova’s activities geared towards enterprise development, where the company can pursue and 
measure its financial and social goals based on relevant, objectively gathered data. 
 
134 Edgard Barki, “unpublished study from the Fundação Getúlio Vargas,” 2017 
 
Figure 4.5. Socioeconomic Survey Example134 
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This partnership also helps illustrate how Terra Nova as a social enterprise undertakes both market-
based activities, to increase intelligence and access, as well as social goals related to different 
forms of value creation. Terra Nova measures value using metrics such as the number of 
agreements reached, the land value before and after the agreement, etc.;135 however, their use of 
partners to gain a more complete and objective view of their impacts shows how social enterprises 
are incentivized to involve a diverse set of partners that can aid the slum regularization process.  
Figure 4.5 shows the results of interviews and surveys conducted with residents involving 
two different settlements with whom Terra Nova has helped regularize. The figure includes the 
results from yes or no questions, as well as a collection of terms that speak to the residents’ 
perception of Terra Nova in their community. Seeing words like “fear” and “concern” transform 
to “hope” and “security” helps speak to the psychological impacts generated by the company. 
Furthermore, the level of agreement with the statements provided serves as a similar indicator.  
My intention in including this figure is not to prove that Terra Nova generates psychological 
impacts, but rather illustrate the information Terra Nova receives from the partners they work with 
in measuring their impacts. Involving these partners helps provide Terra Nova form a well-rounded 
perspective of the issue they seek to address, and their involvement also distinguishes Terra Nova 
as a social enterprise from a traditional for-profit company.   
 
“Facilitate Enterprise Activities” Quadrant Synthesis with Collaborative Interdependence: 
 After discussing the individual components of the PEF section titled “facilitate enterprise 
activities,” I will draw connections between the findings of these components and the overall 
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purpose of this section as outlined in London’s work, specifically in how it relates to collaborative 
interdependence. At its core, “facilitating enterprise activities” relies on connections within the 
community. The community represents the physical location where these activities take place, and 
also make up the population that stands to benefit directly from these activities. This quadrant 
involves enhancing the “flow” of transactions, meaning the total number and/or value of 
transactions, and London correlates flow with “actional enabling” partners. The key players 
involved in this section include Resident Associations, landowners, and independent impact 
measurement groups, and collaborative interdependence between these players allows for success 
in “facilitating enterprise activities.” 
 Market intelligence, market access, and measurements of value creation all depend on one 
another, and the success in one of these activities relates to the success of the others. Meanwhile, 
in coordinating all partners within this section, the social enterprise uses collaborative 
interdependence to aggregate value, and I will explain how this works in the context of Terra Nova. 
 Firstly, accessing a market proves more difficult without first gathering intelligence of the 
market. In Terra Nova’s case, aimlessly approaching residents and inquiring about their interests 
in a large-scale regularization can generate several difficulties. For example, Terra Nova first needs 
to know who serves as a leader in the community, and whether there is already a Resident 
Association established that Terra Nova can coordinate with. André told Harvard researchers: 
“Once I went door-to-door convincing people to engage in the project, but one of the residents also 
went door-to-door, persuading people not to cooperate. In this area, the community association’s 
president didn’t have people’s trust, so our project failed. We had to renegotiate with new leaders 
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and relaunch.”136 Here, a lack of market intelligence led to a lack of market access, showing the 
interdependence of these partnerships between Terra Nova, residents, and President Associations. 
Furthermore, ideological factors prove important to consider in approaching the 
community. For example, in 2007, Terra Nova scheduled a meeting with a 6,000-member 
community in São Paulo known as Pinheirinho to explain the services they can provide. However, 
no residents showed up to the meeting because a local leader convinced them otherwise due to his 
belief that the state should be the ones handling regularizations, not a private company.137 The 
community then did not participate in an agreement with Terra Nova, and were eventually evicted 
four years later. This example shows that without proper market intelligence of local political 
ideologies, market access becomes more difficult. 
More broadly, these examples help illustrate the interdependence between market 
intelligence and market access, where market intelligence facilitates market access, but market 
access also further stimulates market intelligence as Terra Nova builds relationships with 
community leaders that lead to greater levels of intelligence.  
Value creation also comes into play and can take place before and after achieving access 
to the market. For example, Terra Nova can use publicly available information to calculate the size 
of the settlement and the land values, so they can enter the community with an idea of the scale of 
impact that can be achieved. After obtaining this information, as well as access to the market, Terra 
Nova can begin formulating agreements that maximize value creation for all stakeholders. Once 
these agreements have been enacted and lead to service provision, socioeconomic measurements 
then become important for evaluating the value created for residents.  
 
136A. Albuquerque, “Social Regularizer,” 5 
137 Battilana et. al., “Terra Nova,” 8 
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Overall, facilitating enterprise activities refers to the field-based implementation of the 
project, and in Terra Nova’s case this requires a coordination between residents, Resident 
Associations, landowners, public service providers, impact investors, and independent researchers. 
The framework shows how Terra Nova is incentivized to pursue these partnerships to satisfy their 
field-based implementation needs, while collaborative interdependence illustrates how all of these 
enterprise activities and incentives overlap and reinforce one another.  Next I will move onto the 
“facilitate market transactions” quadrant of the framework, which involves activities including 
demand creation and supply enhancement. 
4.42 Facilitate Market Transactions Quadrant 
 
Demand Creation: 
Demand creation involves elements including awareness raising and behavior change, and 
Terra Nova exhibits this behavior through partnering with community organizations. André 
Albuquerque discusses how incorporating training of community leaders in the regularization 
 
Figure 4.6: Facilitate Market Transactions Quadrant 
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process proved crucial to instilling self-management mechanisms that encourage resident’s 
participation past the point of intervention by Terra Nova.138 
For example, in Vila Marinho Terra Nova held a workshop including two training courses on 
Labor for Civil Construction in partnership with the National Service for Industrial Learning 
(SENAI), through which two 40m2 houses were built.139 Here, we see two forms of partnerships 
coming together. One between the community leaders and Terra Nova, and then additionally the 
involvement of SENAI shows another example of an entity that can be involved in the process of 
demand creation.  
SENAI is a network of not-for-profit secondary level professional schools established and 
maintained by the Brazilian Confederation of Industry, which also involves the Social Service of 
Industry (SESI) and the Euvaldo Lodi Institute (IEL). Together this network offers industrial 
 
138 A. Albuquerque, “Social Regularizer,” 25 
139 Ibid. 
 
Figure 4.7: Vila Marinho - SENAI Workshop 
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training in 28 different areas of industry.140 In its workshop with Terra Nova, the company helped 
teach two courses in bricklaying and plumbing, visualized by figure 4.7 below: 
By teaching residents skills like bricklaying and plumbing, residents become physically 
invested in the process as they aid in the construction of new buildings. Furthermore, these skills 
can help maintain the infrastructure after it has been established and can also lead to potential 
employment opportunities for residents. These activities help create demand for Terra Nova’s 
services, for as residents become invested in the process, they become more willing to complete 
their payment plans. Therefore, this partnership with SENAI shows how social enterprises like 
Terra Nova can coordinate partnerships between residents and NGOs to facilitate demand creation. 
Another example of demand creation involves micro-credit financing to enable the BoP to 
participate in the venture.141 As a part of Terra Nova’s services, the company helps implement a 
payment plan for residents with monthly installments extended over 5-10 years. However, as 
mentioned previously, the nature of Terra Nova’s services requires high upfront costs, meaning 
that it requires subsidization until achieving returns in the long run.  
In order to provide for micro-credit financing and enhance demand creation, Terra Nova 
partners with impact investors like MOV Investimentos. MOV represents a form of what London 
calls “patient capital,” or one who understands the long-term, social impact driven nature of the 
work and focuses less on immediate financial returns. These expectations allow for the provision 
of phased payment plans, where the company expects a return on its investment in the long run, 
thereby serving as an effective partner for facilitating demand creation.  
 
 
140 SENAI. “SENAI - Portal Da Indústria.” Portal Da Indústria. National Service of Industrial Training. Accessed 
April 17, 2021. http://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/senai/en/about/senai/. 
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Supply Enhancement: 
According to Dr. London, partners can support “supply enhancement” by “identifying and 
communicating market needs and providing advisory services that help increase the volume, 
quality, and consistency of producer yields.”142 In tailoring this description to the services Terra 
Nova offers, we can view the “supply” or “production” in terms of the land titles, as well as the 
infrastructural services, which require partnerships with Resident Associations, socioeconomic 
survey organizations, and public agencies.  
In regard to identifying and communicating market needs, Terra Nova helps connect 
Resident Associations with public service providers to articulate which types of services the 
community could benefit from the most. By identifying specific services that the community 
needs, the residents become more invested and involved in the project, which can lead to greater 
yields in terms of agreements signed, and payments completed. 
  Furthermore, socioeconomic surveyors help provide advisory services to Terra Nova by 
helping to assess what the community can afford and provide other social contexts for the company 
to take into consideration. These services similarly help Terra Nova come up with a manageable 
payment schedule and they increase market transparency by providing an unbiased source of data 
for Terra Nova to work with in negotiating these large-scale agreements. 
Overall, Terra Nova must pursue these partnerships to ensure that they receive consistent 
returns, especially considering the large upfront costs associated with their work. In order to ensure 
the supply of land titles and infrastructural services, and enhance the quality and consistency within 




companies, and public agencies, serving as another example for how the company is motivated as 
a social enterprise to bring together partners within the regularization system. 
 
“Facilitate Market Transactions” Quadrant Synthesis with Collaborative Interdependence:  
 Supply and demand serve as the core of market transactions, and the PEF shows that 
partnerships can strengthen both sides of the operation. The social enterprise remains responsible 
for coordinating their supply and demand oriented partners, which for Terra Nova most notably 
include community organizations, impact investors, independent advisory organizations, and 
public service providers. The supply and demand depend on one another, so I will discuss how 
collaborative interdependence comes into play for Terra Nova in managing these partnerships. 
 A primary example of this interdependence arises in the provision of public services. Terra 
Nova encourages resident involvement in the physical upgrading process by offering educational 
opportunities about construction and property maintenance. These activities facilitate demand 
creation by helping residents take ownership over the process and understand the benefits. Once 
they receive these benefits in the form of public services, they can then use the skills they learned 
to continue enhancing their service supply, such as through maintaining or repairing infrastructure. 
Here we see how the success of demand creation efforts leads to success for supply enhancement 
later on.  
Furthermore, public agencies cannot provide enhanced services without sufficient demand 
from residents, and this relates to micro crediting options that allow for phased, affordable 
payments. In other words, residents demand public services, but this demand cannot be filled 
without paying for title ownership. By facilitating micro-crediting programs, residents both pay 
for their land title and also allow for public service providers to contribute infrastructural 
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improvements. Exploring this point further, upon completing the payment plan and securing legal 
title to the property, public agencies can then collect taxes from residents, which further enhances 
the government’s ability to provide public services. 
The interplay between actors on the supply and demand sides shows the importance of 
collaboration between parties, as well as the aggregation of value. Value becomes aggregated as 
residents pay for ownership and subsequent taxes, and the government can then offer services that 
the residents demand. Terra Nova’s identity as a social enterprise leads to this supply and demand 
lens, which I argue requires a unique form of collaborative interdependence not facilitated by 
governments alone.  
We can also begin to draw connections to the Facilitate Enterprise Activities Quadrant. 
Most notably, demand creation and market access go hand in hand, where increasing demand for 
Terra Nova’s services thereby increases their access to the market through resident participation. 
Even before this market access can take place, market intelligence is required for directing demand 
creation activities. For example, in gathering market information in identifying prominent 
community leaders, Terra Nova can then implement demand creation activities, like educational 
workshops, through coordination with these leaders. 
Furthermore, supply enhancement relates to the implementation aspect of market access, 
where Terra Nova effectively provides access to the community for government service providers, 
while these providers thereby enhance the supply of public services and help implement them in 
the local market context. Here we see interdependence where the government relies on Terra Nova 
to broker deals that provide access to taxable communities, and then the communities benefit from 
the services they now qualify for and for which Terra Nova has helped establish a demand.  
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Value creation also largely depends on demand creation and supply enhancement because 
while there are theoretical benefits to achieving land title, the community must take part in the 
process and demand a large-scale transformation for Terra Nova to implement its services. Also, 
value creation cannot be achieved without supply enhancement, because supply enhancement 
involves implementing the value proposition. Terra Nova then oversees overall aggregation of 
value involved in the legal regularization process through managing the supply and demand sides 
through peaceful court agreements. 
As I introduce new quadrants in the framework, I will continue to identify these cross-
quadrant relationships and interdependencies to speak to how the enterprise coordinates their entire 
partnership ecosystem using collaborative interdependence. Next I will move onto the “enhance 
enterprise resources” quadrant of the framework that involves partners that correspond to forms of 
financial, human, social, and knowledge capital.  
4.43 Enhance Enterprise Resources Quadrant 
 




Providing a brief investor history is relevant to understanding the current partnership with 
MOV, as well as other partners who operate in the development community sector.  In 2001, 
Albuquerque launched the company with three partners, including a real estate agent named 
Cleuza Homenuck, a friend who specialized in finance named Orlando da Silva, and his brother 
Daniel who held a business degree and gained experience advising a Brazilian congresswoman.143 
André held a 70% stake while the other three partners each held 10%.144  
As the company continued to grow in the next few years and take on more projects, they 
faced greater financial constraints and struggled to find an appropriate price for their services. In 
order to finance their daily operations, Terra Nova turned to short- and medium-term bank loans.145 
By 2010, André, by working with corporate finance expert Leonardo Jianoti, realized that Terra 
Nova was in a dire financial situation and needed a nontraditional investor to survive.146  
By 2011, Paulo Bellotti, a managing partner of an impact investing firm called MOV 
Investimentos in São Paulo, discovered Terra Nova, and he approached André with an investment 
proposition. Jianoti encouraged the investment not only for the financial capital, but also for the 
expertise and networks that the impact investor could offer.147 MOV provided an initial investment 
of R$6.4 million in 2013, and another R$4.5 million for human resources in 2016. At this point, 
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both MOV and Hoffman each held 45% ownership in the firm, while André and Daniel’s 
convertible equity fell to 10%, with the option to increase their shares in the future.148 
MOV also helped Terra Nova establish a minimum payment required by residents during 
the regularization process.149 The minimum payment needed to be increased from R$240 to R$350 
to generate enough terms for Terra Nova to maintain and eventually expand its operations due to 
the high upfront costs required by its model. This price increase, along with decreasing default 
rates and increasing diligence regarding collection and late installments, helped the company 
become more financially stable.150  
Yet as previously mentioned, Terra Nova still requires additional financial support to 
expand their operations and offer micro-crediting options for residents while covering the large 
upfront costs associated with large-scale regularization. Some of these major costs involve the 
socioeconomic surveys of the community, property and environmental assessments, and the 
formulation of an urban project. If I were to use London’s intended approach for this framework 
by strategically identifying areas that could use additional partnership support, financial capital 
would definitely be one to consider. However, my approach focuses on the grounds for partnership 
formation, so including this discussion about Terra Nova’s financial history and partnership with 
MOV speaks to the argument about how social enterprises are incentivized to form effective 
partnerships.  
Due to the high upfront costs of their model, Terra Nova needed to find an investor like 
MOV to provide “patient capital.” “Patient capital” in this case involves an understanding and 
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appreciation of Terra Nova’s community transformation goals that generate economic returns over 
the long run, as opposed to expecting financial returns from short-term projects. Since working 
with MOV, the company has become financially stable and continues to generate widespread 
impact. The company’s ability to reach financial stability through its partnership with MOV shows 
how social enterprises attract “patient capital” that not only helps them survive in BoP markets, 
but in this case specifically helps overcome the high costs of operating within the housing sector.  
 
Human Capital: 
MOV also plays a large role in contributing to the company’s human capital by requiring 
involvement from their team, expanding on training for current employees, and changing how the 
group sought out new workers to expand on their intangible assets. Broadly, MOV instituted 
practices that require TN to expand on experiences and training for their employees, thereby 
improving their human capital.  
For example, one of MOV’s executives, Dennis Nakahara, joined Terra Nova’s board of 
directors.151 Here, MOV directly contributes human capital in the form of a new team member, 
who brings ideas and perspectives largely from the impact investment and development 
organization arena. Also, as previously discussed, MOV helped Terra Nova establish a new 
financial structure and payment system as well, and also helped formulate their “impact thesis” 
and set requirements for measuring social impacts. These factors represent different forms of 
training for the team by providing additional business management skills, which in turn increase 




portfolio that help share best practices, as well as successes and failures from the field, through 
which the Terra Nova team can learn and improve.  
MOV also instituted a new hiring process that required a more traditional resume-interview 
based process as opposed to the word-of-mouth hiring that the company previously relied upon.152 
This formalization of the process led to an increase in human capital by encouraging the hiring of 
workers based on their qualifications and expertise instead of considering their proximate 
relationship to another coworker. This process then leads to a larger and more skilled pool of 
applicants to choose from in forming an effective enterprise team. In this way, MOV helps 
contribute human capital in the form of new hires with a higher skill level that can increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the team. 
Human capital proves particularly important for a social enterprise because operating in 
developing markets requires flexibility and a collaborative mindset, so constructing a team with 
these qualities plays a large role in achieving long-term, large-scale success for a social enterprise. 
Terra Nova’s identity as a social enterprise incentivizes this connection with MOV and Nakahara, 
who then help Terra Nova create a better team and business model that benefits the residents Terra 
Nova seeks to serve by providing higher quality, consistent services. 
 
Knowledge Capital: 
Partners can provide knowledge capital through access to “processes, tools, and 
frameworks.”153 While MOV could be considered under this category as well, I will focus on the 
company’s partnerships within a group they call, “International Cooperation Institutions.” The 
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institutions I will focus on in this discussion include the Schwab Foundation, Ashoka, and the 
Global Land Alliance.  
Ashoka identifies themselves as a “citizen-sector” organization who works with social 
entrepreneurs towards their overall mission to make large-scale changes to society.154 The group 
identifies and recruits social entrepreneurs to become a part of the Ashoka Network, and those 
who pass the selection process become Ashoka Fellows. Ashoka Fellows benefit from a financial 
stipend, which allows them to pay for personal expenses for up to three years to devote more time 
to the social innovation project. To fund the stipends, Ashoka raises funds from donors and uses 
the funds as venture capital to support their fellows.  
Along with the stipend, a partnership with Ashoka involves many other benefits, some of 
which come in the form of Knowledge Capital. Ashoka promotes a framework to guide enterprises 
in what Ashoka refers to as a “Collaborate Entrepreneurship Jujitsu” (CEJ) process. The 
framework process details critical skills and lenses for a “changemaker” to take, including the 
overarching elements: cognitive empathy, sophisticated teamwork, new leadership, and 
changemaking. Overall, this framework seeks to advise enterprises in structuring their teams to 
effectively keep up with an evolving and interconnected entrepreneurial environment, while 
identifying skills that these team members should possess. 
To teach and implement this framework, Ashoka holds various meetings throughout the 
year, bringing together different groups of fellows for workshops and seminars. More specifically, 
these workshops involve large group discussions between fellows, talks lead by featured fellows 
and outside speakers. Ashoka also provides digital learning materials including videos and 
accompanying exercises, say in “social finance,” to advise enterprises in generating and managing 
 
154Ashoka “The Ashoka Fellowship” Ashoka: Everyone a Changemaker. Ashoka. Accessed April 17, 2021. 
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their financial capital. Ashoka states that they create their models based on patterns in the work of 
their fellows, whose impact Ashoka helps to monitor and aggregate for five-year Impact 
Assessment Reports. Ashoka also mentions that they take “how-to” models from the fellows 
themselves, showing how Ashoka works to compile and aggregate knowledge for the benefit of 
partners like Terra Nova. 
One housing-specific example of aggregating knowledge from Ashoka Fellows for can be 
illustrated by Table 2. Here, this table identifies main principles and takeaways from Ashoka 
Fellows operating in the housing field, as well as barriers identified by these groups. The figure 
summarizes the identifies the specific enterprises to point to the sources of evidence for these 
takeaways. Terra Nova can use information like this in identifying fellows to learn from, and for 
identifying factors that can influence their success in the housing market. 
Similarly, the Schwab Foundation also provides opportunities to gain knowledge and 
resources. The Schwab Foundation is the sister organization of the World Economic Forum, both 
founded by Klaus Schwab. The WEF classifies itself as the “International Organization for Public-
Private Cooperation.”  In 2008, Terra Nova founder André Albuquerque received an award from 
the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship for Terra Nova’s innovative work in favela 
communities, and Terra Nova continues to participate in the Schwab Foundation’s network of 
social entrepreneurs.  
By being a part of a network with such a close association with the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), Terra Nova and other partners can access reports from the World Economic Forum that 
are “designed for any social entrepreneur or social sector leader looking for strategies and tools to  
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influence the broader system in which they operate.”156 Furthermore, being an awardee of the 
Schwab Foundation brings the opportunity to partake in WEF meetings, which are normally closed 
off to WEF members. These exclusive opportunities allow for the interchange of ideas and 
accumulation of knowledge that can help Terra Nova strategize as a social enterprise.  
Terra Nova’s recent partnership with Global Land Alliance (GLA) also serves to contribute 
knowledge capital in several forms. According to a representative from GLA, the partnership 
involves implementing organizational upgrades for Terra Nova including enhanced financial 
management tools and IT expertise, use of geospatial technology, a revamped marketing strategy, 
and more granular data analysis to help track impact on land value, incomes, and well-being.157 
This partnership began in 2019, and remains in the development stage as Terra Nova plans to scale 
to other states in Brazil. The partnership formed in the context of Terra Nova’s incentives to 
expand their organization and achieve greater impacts, as well as financial returns. The formation 
of this partnership illustrates how the pursuit of knowledge capital in scaling the enterprise can 
lead to mutually beneficial relationships between social enterprises and NGOs. 
 
Social Capital: 
Social capital refers to the access an enterprise has to networks and legitimacy within the 
markets they seek to serve. This statement is purposefully broad, as companies like Terra Nova 
may require many different types of social capital, including access to networks of organizations 
in the social impact and entrepreneurship field, as well as legitimacy in operating with local 
communities and alongside governments. In the next quadrant of the framework will discuss how 
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Terra Nova gained legitimacy in operating with local communities and governments in the form 
of Legal Infrastructure. In this section I will focus on their networks and legitimacy in the field of 
social impact entrepreneurship. 
We see organizations like MOV Investimentos, Ashoka, and the Schwab Foundation come 
up as important partners for Terra Nova in this sector, because each organization includes 
thousands of other fellows and partners that create a network for Terra Nova to exchange ideas. 
Within this exchange of ideas, Terra Nova can then gain recognition and feedback on their 
methodology from entrepreneurs and influential organizations in the social development field.  
This recognition and feedback lead to legitimacy regarding their identity as a social enterprise, 
where other experts in the field acknowledge the success and functionality of Terra Nova’s work.  
Legitimacy proves particularly important for a social enterprise because many people hold 
a critical view of private intervention into social issues due to the dual motivation between impact 
and profit.158 People are understandably critical of this dual motivation for fear of exploitation of 
the population the company claims to serve. In Brazil, Daniel recalls how few people used or 
understood the term “social enterprise” in Terra Nova’s early days of operation. Now, he said the 
company is known as the “gold of social business in Brazil, and one of the first companies that 
declared themselves social enterprises.”159 He also mentioned how winning awards from the 
Schwab Foundation and a well-known newspaper called Folha de São Paulo helped raise their 
work and the idea of social enterprises to greater importance in the country. 
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In receiving support for their work as a social enterprise, Terra Nova can then attract 
partners, impact investors, and take part in entrepreneurship networks like the Ashoka 
Changemakers Network. Ashoka has 3,600 fellows, as well as other entrepreneur partners. This 
network allows for the interchange of ideas and a wide network that Terra Nova can tap into for 
resources or advice, which will help facilitate the company’s success. Ashoka facilitates this 
interchange of ideas by holding regional meetings and seminars to bring Ashoka Fellows together. 
By being invited to these seminars and conferences and meeting a larger network of social 
entrepreneurs, Terra Nova continues to build its legitimacy through relationships in the social 
development sector.  
The same occurs within the Schwab Foundation’s network, which, as previously 
mentioned, includes access to the WEF. By participating in the WEF network Terra Nova 
effectively builds its social capital by networking with other influential groups in the development 
sphere of public-private partnerships. Connections with the WEF also led to recognition by the 
World Bank, and they went as far as to include Terra Nova in their report on land regularizations 
in Brazil.160 Being connected to and featured by these international organizations helps establish 
legitimacy for the company in their identity as a social enterprise, and subsequently stimulates 
demand creation as more people become aware of the services and benefits Terra Nova has to 
offer. 
 
“Enhance Enterprise Resources” Quadrant Synthesis with Collaborative Interdependence: 
 Collaborative interdependence comes into play in managing these partners that provide 
different types of capital. This section of the framework refers to partners who can enhance the 
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“stock” of the enterprise, or the value of its assets. Managing this variety of assets thereby helps 
build the enterprise’s “capacity” for executing social change. The major partners identified in this 
section include MOV, the Schwab Foundation, Ashoka, and Global Land Alliance. Collaborative 
interdependence comes into play here where the enterprise benefits from the resources provided 
by these partners, and the partners benefit from Terra Nova’s involvement in the networks and the 
results they generate. Furthermore, while these different investors and partners do not need to work 
together in the same way that residents, landowners, and governments must work together, Terra 
Nova can use resources provided by one partner to benefit another. 
 For example, MOV serves as a source of financial capital, and financial capital helps 
facilitate many of Terra Nova’s core services, such as its micro crediting payment options for 
residents. Ashoka can then provide knowledge capital to help Terra Nova manage this financial 
capital, say through their online videos and exercises regarding “social finance.” Then, Terra Nova 
can share the results of its micro crediting programs with Ashoka and its network of fellows to 
enhance their knowledge capital. Here we see interdependence come into play, where Terra Nova 
gains knowledge capital from Ashoka Fellows, uses it to manage their financial capital, and then 
Ashoka Fellows similarly benefit from learning about Terra Nova’s results. 
Knowledge capital can also influence human capital, where Ashoka’s frameworks for building 
effective teams can be applied to the management of team members, such as those provided by 
MOV. Furthermore, social capital and knowledge capital in this case are provided by many of the 
same partners, showing how access to social networks leads to the accumulation of knowledge 
capital through interactions with other enterprises and experts. 
 Social enterprises like Terra Nova must coordinate their enterprise resources in a manner 
that generates benefit for themselves, and also returns that benefit to their investors and the 
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networks they are a part of, illustrating the need for an approach of collaborative interdependence. 
Building on this idea, I will explore how these enterprise resources interact with the other quadrants 
in the framework that I have introduced thus far.  
 Activities to generate market intelligence, market access, value creation, and demand 
creation all require significant upfront investment that can be aided by partners in the Enhance 
Enterprise Resource Quadrant, namely including impact investors like MOV. For example, 
financial capital allows Terra Nova to contract private socioeconomic survey companies to 
generate market intelligence. Furthermore, the knowledge capital Terra Nova receives can inform 
both market intelligence finding efforts, as well as efforts to measure value creation. For example, 
Terra Nova takes steps to measure their value creation through activities like socioeconomic 
surveys, and knowledge capital can contribute frameworks and business best-practices for 
interpreting these results. 
 Meanwhile, all of Terra Nova's individual efforts regarding Facilitating Enterprise 
Activities and Market Transactions reflect back on the social and knowledge capital provided to 
them through entrepreneurship networks. More specifically, Terra Nova can offer information they 
learned in generating market intelligence to Ashoka or Schwab Fellows, which can help direct 
these fellow’s market creation activities. Another example could involve Terra Nova sharing its 
value creation impacts with these networks. 
 My major takeaway from this cross-quadrant analysis involves enterprise resources, like 
financial, social, human, and knowledge capital, all serving to support Terra Nova in carrying out 
activities in the upper two quadrants, like gathering market intelligence, access, creating demand 
etc. Then, Terra Nova can offer their success and other findings generated by these activities back 
to their partners and networks in which they participate in similar forms of knowledge and social 
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capital. The reciprocity identified within the quadrant thereby extends outside of the quadrant to 
help build the “capacity” to support “action-enabling” partners. Specifically, we see partners like 
Ashoka and Schwab becoming a part of the interdependent land regularization system, even 
though these partners do not directly participate in Terra Nova’s business model as directly as 
residents, landowners, governments, and even impact investors like MOV. 
Moving forward, I will discuss the final section of the framework, “Enhance Market 
Environment,” which involves partners that help bolster the company’s value chain infrastructure, 
legal infrastructure, and institutional infrastructure. 
4.44 Enhance Market Environment Quadrant 
 
Value Chain Infrastructure: 
According to London, support for the Value Chain Infrastructure should enhance one’s 
“competitiveness and performance at the industry level [...] for example in building a more robust 
 
Figure 4.9: Enhance Market Environment Quadrant 
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physical infrastructure encouraging certification or improving transparency across the players in 
the value chain.” Interestingly, a large part of the support identified for the value chain 
infrastructure relates to Terra Nova’s services. Terra Nova works to improve transparency between 
landowners, residents, public agencies, the judiciary, registry offices, as well as outside consultants 
and investors. The mediations and formation of agreements that Terra Nova undertakes aim to 
increase transparency between partners. Furthermore, Terra Nova’s services largely involve 
helping to ensure “certification” in the form of achieving bylaws for Resident Associations and 
legal titling for the community, as well as “physical infrastructure” through public service 
provision.  
Through its core services Terra Nova is establishing the value chain infrastructure for the 
legal titling market. They remain the only company to provide this service in Brazil, and their 
methodology proves unique on a global scale. Therefore, London’s note about competition proves 
less relevant at the moment, where instead of improving infrastructure and certification to compete 
with another company, Terra Nova incorporates these activities into its value proposition. 
To support Terra Nova in creating the value chain infrastructure for the legal titling market, 
important partnerships arise including those with Resident Associations and within governments. 
Government support proves necessary to maintain the value chain because of their involvement in 
urban planning policy and service provision. Therefore, to enhance their ability to establish and 
perform within the legal titling market, Terra Nova becomes incentivized to form long standing 






Partnerships that enhance legal infrastructure focus on impacting policies that regulate and 
control the market. London provides examples such as “encouraging the development of policies 
and regulations that create a more business-friendly market environment or advocating for greater 
public investment in certain sectors or geographic locations.”161 In Terra Nova’s case, legal 
infrastructure proves particularly important because their services involve judicial agreements, and 
their activities also intersect with public sector policies to address informal settlements. In many 
ways, Terra Nova works closely with local courts and public sector agencies to help achieve their 
mutual policy goals, showing how Terra Nova’s efforts to enhance their market environment 
brings value to itself, its stakeholders, and partners. 
As previously detailed, Terra Nova operates based on a specific provision of the Brazilian 
Civil Code, Article 1228. However, before the implementation of this code, Terra Nova faced 
difficulties communicating its mission to public officials and faced negative press. In one of Terra 
Nova’s first cases as an incorporated company in 2001, the Pinhais’ town hall refused to relocate 
families involved in the project from the riverbanks, which stalled project approval and worked in 
the opposing interest of enhancing the market environment for Terra Nova.162 Terra Nova’ lack of 
legitimacy at the time serves as a major reason the Pinhais’ town hall refused to cooperate with 
Terra Nova.163  
However, as discussed under the Judicial Agreement section, a new provision in the Civil 
Code in 2002, namely Article 1228, created an opportunity for a privatized regularization process. 
André started to persuade local judges that this article allowed for “judicial expropriations” by a 
 
161 London, “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 153 
162 Battilana et. al., “Terra Nova,” 4 
163 Ibid. 
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private firm to fall under a “regularization process” as opposed to a commercial real estate deal. 
This interpretation provided legal legitimacy in the face of public criticism regarding the private 
nature of Terra Nova’s intervention. Furthermore, André’s interpretation allowed the firm to 
collect payment before urban project approvals, thereby enabling the start of their phased payment 
plan earlier on in the process. By directly approaching local judiciaries to propose this 
interpretation, Terra Nova effectively built a partnership with the court system that in turn 
enhanced its market environment through legal legitimacy and by enabling their phased payment 
system.  
Another important partnership arose in the state-controlled firm COHAPAR that worked 
to implement housing policies for the state government of Paraná.164 The partnership arose from 
Terra Nova’s difficulty in relocating families that lived on precarious riverbanks in Pinhais, so 
once the company learned that COHAPAR had made land titling a priority, they approached the 
state firm for help in managing these families. COHAPAR agreed to both relocate the families and 
provide water, energy, and sewage to the area of relocation. This partnership benefited Terra Nova 
through assistance in providing public services, but also through legitimacy. According to Daniel, 
“After bringing COHAPAR into our projects, we ceased to be seen as a company that was making 
demands and taking problems to city officials; we became solution providers. The mayor changed 
his position and opened the town hall doors to us.” 
Part of the reason the government began viewing Terra Nova as a solution provider relates 
to the results the company generated for COHAPAR. The partnership ended up saving the 
government R$30 million, as paying for expropriations remains the most expensive part of the 
 
164 Ibid.  
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regularization process, and Terra Nova’s pre-solved agreements greatly helped lower these costs. 
André noted: 
“The partnership that Terra Nova formed with COHAPAR [...] highlights the efficacy of 
Terra Nova’s regularization model compared to the efforts of the government. From 2004-
2007, COHAPAR and Terra Nova formed a partnership to regularize areas in the 
metropolitan region of Curitiba. According to a COHAPAR executive, the partnership 
regularized 7,000 families, while the housing agency managed to regularize only 1,500 
households in areas where it acted alone during the same time period.”165 
Here, we see how effective the partnership is for Terra Nova in regard to enhancing their 
ability to operate in the local market, while also benefiting the state agency as well by increasing 
efficiency and lowering costs by millions of dollars.166 
This partnership also led to the development of a statute called the Paraná Social 
Regularizer PL, State Law Project. The first two articles of the law state: 
“Art. 1 The Paraná Housing Company - COHAPAR is authorized to establish a partnership with 
the Social Regularizer and the Municipalities, in order to promote urbanization and land 
regularization of urban areas, with a view to inserting consolidated informal settlements in the city 
formal. 
Art. 2 For the purposes of this Law, the Social Regulator is defined as a legal entity of private law 
duly constituted for the purpose of land tenure regularization and registered with the Commercial 
Registry.” 
We see how Terra Nova’s partnership with COHAPAR led to favorable policies to 
facilitate the company’s activities in the local market, which also benefited COHAPAR by 
increasing efficiency and lowering costs. This law represents an example of how social enterprises 
like Terra Nova can be incorporated into government regularization policies, and how social 
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enterprises are incentivized to create these mutually beneficial partnerships. While Terra Nova no 
longer partners with COHAPAR, the partnership played an integral role to the company’s efforts 
in gaining legitimacy, which allowed Terra Nova to expand by allowing other states and localities 
to reference Terra Nova’s work in Paraná.  
 
Institutional Infrastructure: 
Regarding the institutional infrastructure portion of the framework, London notes that “in 
order to ensure the persistence of the market and its legitimacy, investments can also be made in 
structures that support it, such as the banking, legal, and property institutions.”167 In terms of 
infrastructure for the housing sector, one of the most important elements includes record-keeping 
through databases that include socioeconomic information as well as maps of individual properties 
and their form of ownership. These databases in Brazil are referred to as “cadastres,” and can 
include National, state, and municipal organizations that manage the mapping and record keeping 
of property information.  
Figure 4.1 includes a list of different registry systems in Brazil, totaling to over nine 
different groups, not including those of specific states and municipalities. However, despite the 
plethora of agencies charged with the task of record keeping, Brazil notoriously faces a lack of 
consolidation and completeness of these systems. The World Bank notes:  
“What exist rather are technically deficient cadastres developed by each municipality for 
their multiple purposes, typically built up from subdivision maps. Adding to this complexity, to be 
formally possessed, property rights must be recorded in the notaries' land registries, a system of 
privately administered public registries (cartorios) which many times is incomplete and not linked 
to updated geographic information about the parcels. Moreover, federal government, states and 
municipalities also have their own land registries and they administrate their land assets with a 
certain degree of autonomy.”  
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Here, Terra Nova faces an obstacle in ensuring its competitiveness and efficiency, where dozens 
of agencies must be coordinated to obtain housing information that remains crucial to nearly every 
aspect of the regularization process, from the diagnostic phase, to the development of the urban 
plan, to the implementation of services thereafter. 
In order to address a lack of consistent mapping software and property data, Terra Nova 
recently entered into a partnership with the Global Land Alliance, funded by a grant from 
PlaceFund, a branch of the Omidyar Network. Global Land Alliance’s approach to partnerships 
states: “We work in flexible alliances with key partners who have established, long-term 
relationships with Land Alliance core team members.” Here, the terms long-term and flexible 
indicates elements of collaborative interdependence, which will be discussed further in the 
following section. PlaceFund is an NGO that focuses on property rights and developing geospatial 
technology for mapping communities and providing public and easily accessible data. This 
partnership serves as an investment in the institutional infrastructure that Terra Nova operates 
within by improving the property data available in Brazil. The partnership launched in 2019, so 
the project remains in the development stages, but the founders have indicated the importance of 
incorporating geospatial technology as the future of their company’s expansion. 
Overall, this partnership shows how social enterprises like Terra Nova are incentivized to 
create mutually beneficial relationships that enhance their market environment. Terra Nova offers 
access to informal settlement communities in their relationships with residents, while GLA and 
PlaceFund provide financial capital and mapping software that aid Terra Nova’s methodology. 
Simultaneously both parties achieve a goal of greater data availability that also benefits other key 
players like governments agencies.  
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“Enhance Market Environment” Synthesis with Collaborative Interdependence: 
 Enhance Market Environment falls under capacity building and market creation which 
involves enhancing the “stock” or the value of assets in the market environment in which the 
enterprise operates.168 For Terra Nova, enhancing these assets requires coordination among various 
partners, most notably government agencies, the judicial system, and NGOs including Global Land 
Alliance (GLA) and PlaceFund. Elements of collaborative interdependence appear in examining 
how these relationships intersect. 
 Beginning with the company’s partnership with GLA to enhance the institutional 
infrastructure, Terra Nova can use this partnership to offer value to its partners that work in legal 
infrastructure. Terra Nova’s partners in the legal sector, including public agencies, notoriously 
lack a condensed land “cadastre,” or a set of maps and data that contribute to public information 
about both formal and informal properties in the country. By integrating GLA’s geospatial 
technology and mapping into its model, Terra Nova can then provide this data to governments, 
and this data can serve to shape the legal infrastructure by providing a more informed system 
influencing policies regarding informal settlements. 
 Furthermore, partnerships with those in the legal sector offer benefits to GLA that Terra 
Nova helps present in coordinating these relationships. For example, Terra Nova’s partnership 
with Paraná’s state housing company COHAPAR led to a state law for the “social regularizer.” By 
embedding Terra Nova’s services into a state law, Terra Nova effectively enhances their 
environment to operate by securing legislative support, which benefits GLA by providing market 
access and a vessel for applying their geospatial technology.  
 
168 London, “Base of the Pyramid Promise,” 152 
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 Moving onto the value chain infrastructure, I previously discussed how the activities 
involved enhancing the value chain infrastructure reflect many of Terra Nova’s services. Namely, 
their services involve in coordinating physical infrastructure development, quality assurance, and 
certification through legal titling, and market transparency. While this section of the framework 
involves partners like government agencies, it more accurately reflects Terra Nova’s application 
of collaborative interdependence by coordinating all members of the value chain. For example, 
beginning with coordinating certification for properties through Cooperation Agreements, to 
enhancing market transparency through council meetings, to facilitating the provision of physical 
infrastructure upon achieving title.  
 Terra Nova’s work in this section of the framework intersects with that of legal 
infrastructure by offering value to governments in exchange for preferential legal policies. 
Returning to the COHAPAR example, once the state of Paraná realized that by working with Terra 
Nova, they could save millions of dollars in costs to remove and relocate residents, they created a 
law to embed Terra Nova’s services into their state legislation. Here we see collaborative 
interdependence at play, where not only does Terra Nova align the interests of a wide variety of 
partners to enhance their value chain, but they present the results of this value aggregation to their 
partners in the legal sector through pre-formed judicial agreements.  
 Furthermore, partnerships regarding the institutional infrastructure, i.e. with GLA, 
intersects with Terra Nova’s work in enhancing their value chain. Part of the value chain 
enhancement involves achieving market transparency, so involving a partner like GLA to invest 
in mapping technology contributes to transparency by providing sources of data. This data can also 
be used for directing partnerships to enhance physical infrastructure, say by providing mapping 
services to generate an urban project in an area that lacked public data. 
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 These different forms of market infrastructure detailed in this quadrant of the framework 
inherently intersect, especially in regard to the cross-sectoral issue of land regularization. Terra 
Nova’s management of different partners in their pursuit to enhance their market environment 
therefore leads to collaboration within these different forms of infrastructure. This collaboration 
did not previously exist in the fragmented government system in Brazil, so coordinating these 
partnerships proves necessary not only for Terra Nova’s operations as a social enterprise, but also 
for one that specifically works with a large-scale cross sectoral issue like housing. 
This quadrant also maintains strong interdependent connections with the other quadrants 
of the framework. For example, social capital and legal infrastructure specifically connect in the 
Terra Nova case study because they provide interdependent forms of legitimacy for the enterprise. 
Social capital helps solidify Terra Nova recognition as a social enterprise which helps overcome 
potential criticism about private intervention into a public issue like slum upgrading. Meanwhile, 
legal legitimacy through building relationships with local courts and the implementation of 
preferential policies allows Terra Nova to operate locally. Legal legitimacy and social legitimacy 
reinforce one another to allow Terra Nova local success in implementing their services, as well as 
international success that helps enhance enterprise resources and build the company’s capacity to 
implement these services. In other words, these forms of legitimacy contribute to market access, 
an element of the Facilitate Enterprise Activities Quadrant. Here we see how enhancing both the 
“market environment” and the “enterprise resources” can be coordinated in a way to “facilitate 
enterprise activities.”  
Another example arises in regard to institutional infrastructure, where efforts to enhance 
the enterprise resources through financial, knowledge, and human capital combine with efforts to 
enhance the property sector through a partnership with Global Land Alliance. The financial capital 
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provided by the corresponding PlaceFund grant, coupled with the increased human and knowledge 
capital, in the form of technical expertise, are concentrated in this partnership. Terra Nova then 
works with GLA to enhance the institutional infrastructure of the property cadastre system, 
benefiting themselves, GLA, and local governments through increased data transparency and 
efficiency. 
Enhancing the institutional infrastructure in this way also applies to supply enhancement. 
For example, supply enhancement involves advisory services, largely carried out in the viability 
study and diagnostic stage that generate a topographic environmental assessment of the community 
land. With greater mapping technology provided by GLA, the company can better enhance its 
supply and ability to coordinate public service provision. Here we see how “enhancing enterprise 
resources” and the “market environment” thereby “facilitate market transactions.” 
Lastly, Terra Nova’s role in enhancing the value chain infrastructure intersects with all 
quadrants of the framework, namely in their coordination of multi-stakeholder councils. Multi-
stakeholder councils are involved in all elements of the value-chain infrastructure, including 
physical infrastructure represented by public service providers, quality assurance and certification 
through the collective formation of judicial agreements, and market transparency in providing a 
forum for dialogue and negotiation.  
Establishing this council requires both market intelligence and access, where local leaders 
are recruited to represent their community. Furthermore, this council effectively coordinates 
market transactions by establishing the residents’ willingness to pay, the landowner’s preference 
for land price, and the implementation and enhancement of the public service supply. Enterprise 
resources come in to support all of these activities through human and knowledge capital, which 
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provides for a flexible and effective team with a well-informed business strategy to form and 
coordinate these partnerships within the council.  
A major takeaway from this synthesis shows how enhancing the enterprise resources can 
lead to partnerships that enhance the market environment, as demonstrated by the GLA 
partnership. Then, specifically for Terra Nova, the company’s efforts to enhance their value chain 
infrastructure leads to a multi-stakeholder council which facilitates enterprise activities and market 
transactions. Terra Nova’s role in coordinating their value chain through a multi-stakeholder 
council and through cooperation agreements helps encapsulate my argument about social 
enterprises’ contribution to regularization systems. The cross-sectoral nature of this system 
requires coordination to enhance the value chain infrastructure that extends from landowners in 
the real estate market, to residents of informal settlements, to courts in providing land title, to 
governments in providing public services, to impact investors and international entrepreneurship 
networks with resources to offer this system. Terra Nova’s ability to coordinate these different 
partnerships to carry out their business model, which effectively revolves around enhancing the 




This chapter outlined Terra Nova’s methodology to help illustrate the different partnerships 
required in the regularization process, and then categorized these partnerships using the 
Partnership Ecosystem Framework. I used the Partnership Ecosystem Framework to illustrate how 
different activities required by a social enterprise incentivize the formation of partnerships within 
the regularization system that did not previously exist. These partnerships are necessary for an 
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efficient and peaceful legal titling process, so understanding the grounds for their formation helps 
illustrate the need for social enterprises within the legal titling process for informal settlements. 
Lastly, by synthesizing the findings from each section of the framework, this chapter provided a 
discussion on how collaborative interdependence comes into play in managing these different 
partnerships within and between framework quadrants. The following chapter will recap these 
findings across the major partners within the framework and present implications and limitations 

















Chapter V: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will review the evidence that informal settlement regularization could 
benefit from collaborative interdependence provided by a social enterprise like Terra Nova. I will 
discuss the limitations of my argument as well as its implications: I intend my findings to inform 
the establishment of new enterprises in other geographic locations.  
 
5.2 Summary of Findings 
Chapter 3 introduced the concept of collaborative interdependence as an approach that 
social enterprises can take in managing their partnership ecosystem, specifically within 
relationships with governments, impact investors, and members of the BoP. Specifically, 
collaborative interdependence by a social enterprise serves as a solution to the “box model” of 
governance in Brazil. Furthermore, Terra Nova shows how social enterprises can build 
relationships with the population they seek to serve, i.e. the BoP, in this case, residents of informal 
settlements in Brazil. Lastly, Chapter 3 demonstrated that social enterprises like Terra Nova are 
incentivized to work with impact investors, and these relationships based in collaborative 
interdependence help concentrate resources to informal settlements that help enterprises overcome 
the high up-front costs of operating in the housing sector. 
Chapter 4 built on these claims by mapping Terra Nova’s partners using the Partnership 
Ecosystem Framework. This framework identifies different activities that must be undertaken by 
a social enterprise to achieve success in a developing market context. “Success” in this case refers 
to the enterprise’s ability to generate social impact, economic returns, and eventually expand and 
operate on a greater scale to multiply these impacts. Identifying these specific activities and how 
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they relate to Terra Nova’s methodology shows whom they are incentivized to build relationships 
with. Furthermore, exploring the partnership ecosystem in this way contributes to a discussion 
about how managing this ecosystem with an approach of collaborative interdependence makes 
these relationships effective.  
My analytic strategy for this case study involved using the theory of collaborative 
interdependence in combination with the Partnership Ecosystem Framework, as London directs in 
his research. The major takeaway from my synthesis is that partners activities can be coordinated 
in a way that achieves the goals of the parties, in this case, settling land disputes. Through this 
process, Terra Nova creates value for all partners and stakeholders involved, supporting my 
argument that social enterprises can contribute cross-sectoral solutions to the issue of informal 
settlement regularization.  
Regarding value created for residents, activities dictated in the PEF, such as generating 
market intelligence, market access, value creation, demand creation, build the kind of collaborative 
relationships that help residents overcome barriers to participation in the formal property system. 
Upon receiving title ownership and service provision, residents experience gains in broader areas 
of health, wealth, and agency. 
For landowners, Terra Nova carries out activities to gather market intelligence as well as 
pursuing supply enhancement and improvements in the value chain infrastructure. The 
relationships they build with landowners create value by assessing their needs for repayment on 
their properties, and by facilitating their negotiations with residents and service providers. As a 
result of this process, which is carried out with a great degree of transparency, landowners receive 
economic returns on their land while avoiding the task of formulating an urban project and 
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initiating court procedures. In a word, Terra Nova provides a way for landowners to achieve 
economic returns on their property with more efficiency.  
Public service providers become involved through PEF-dictated activities such market 
access, supply enhancement, and most notably, through Terra Nova’s pursuit to enhance their 
market environment through the value chain, legal, and institutional infrastructures. By building 
collaborative relationships with these public service agencies and, most importantly governments, 
Terra Nova performs a coordinating role, increasing efficiency and decreasing conflict. 
Furthermore, once properties become regularized, public agencies can then collect taxes to further 
support infrastructure and services improvements. 
Terra Nova’s efforts to enhance their legal infrastructure have involved local judiciaries. 
As a result of Terra Nova’s approach to dispute resolution, they are effectively bringing already 
resolved agreements to the court. These agreements benefit the judiciary by helping to overcome 
cases that the courts previously found “unsolvable.” The success of this partnership determines the 
success of the rest of Terra Nova’s activities: the cooperation agreements mean little without 
cooperation and ratification by the judiciary. Therefore, collaborative interdependence helps align 
the goals of all parties with the judiciary who similarly benefits from increased efficiency. 
The need for capital, whether financial, human, or social, brings in impact investors. Impact 
investors like MOV help finance and facilitate a wide range of activities that aid the company’s 
success by enhancing the enterprise’s resources, and, therefore, their capacity to carry out their 
core services. When a social enterprise is successful, impact investors benefit from the economic 
return on their investment as well as the social benefits that generate this economic return, which 
in this case involves housing security. 
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Entrepreneurship networks that are less directly involved like the Schwab Foundation and 
the Ashoka Changemakers Network help provide knowledge and social capital that Terra Nova 
can use to enhance its legitimacy and capacity to implement its services. Terra Nova benefits from 
its participation in the network through social and knowledge capital, while its successes reflect 
back on this same network and furthers the core social and entrepreneurship goals of these 
organizations.  
Furthermore, partnerships like the ones that have been established with Global Land 
Alliance and PlaceFund contribute financial capital and help enhance the housing sector’s 
institutional infrastructure by contributing technology and expertise in mapping software that can 
be used to increase market transparency and efficiency. These partners then benefit from Terra 
Nova because the company serves as a vehicle for spreading their technology and impact. While 
Terra Nova and its implementation processes benefit from increased technology and data 
availability, the partner that provides this technology benefits by achieving market access.  
The PEF and collaborative interdependence involve many components that help illustrate 
both the incentives of a social enterprise, as well as the complexity of social issues like informal 
settlement regularization. The complexity in the partnership ecosystem reflects the complexity of 
the issue at hand, which points to social enterprises' contribution in managing these relationships 
and the interdependent benefits that the enterprise can generate for all partners.  
My use of this theory and framework comes with limitations. Moving forward I will discuss the 
implications and limitations of both CI and the PEF, as well as my argument as a whole.  
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5.3 Implications and Limitations of Collaborative Interdependence Theory 
This section will reflect a structure similar to Chapter 3, where I discuss how collaborative 
interdependence can be applied to relationships with governments, impact investors, and residents 
of information settlements, this time focusing on its application to contexts outside of Terra Nova. 
 
 Relationships with Governments: 
Collaborative interdependence in itself does not require government involvement. The 
theory’s core involves building relationships based on mutual benefit, and these relationships can 
take place with a wide range of partners. However, in the context of my argument, collaborative 
interdependence proves particularly useful in managing government bureaucracy. I believe social 
enterprises can contribute the most value in these cases due to the cross-sectoral nature of slum 
regularization that typically involves several different public agencies. 
This claim carries a conundrum. I argue that social enterprises can best contribute an 
approach of collaborative interdependence in situations of high levels of bureaucracy, yet these 
high levels of bureaucracy indicate higher levels of development and formal systems. The 
conundrum arises in that the BoP context is intrinsically underdeveloped and largely informal. In 
seeking out areas with higher levels of bureaucracy, one begins to exclude the most 
underdeveloped regions that could benefit the most from social enterprises’ involvement.  
From this paradox, the question arises: what if governments lack the bureaucratic capacity 
or desire to upgrade informal settlements? How can a social enterprise still offer value in 
addressing large-scale slum upgrading and regularization by using collaborative interdependence 
in areas that do not face the “box model” of governance, and instead face inverse issues such as 
limited government capacity, or a lack of slum upgrading policies? 
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As discussed in the introductory chapter, Brazil began adopting policies focused on slum 
upgrading over eradication in the late 20th century. Though the implementation of these policies 
faced high levels of bureaucracy from specialized government agencies, the policies themselves 
illustrated the government’s willingness to find solutions for informal settlements that opened the 
door for partnerships with enterprises such as Terra Nova.  
Terra Nova founder André Albuquerque similarly identifies that public policies meant to 
address informal settlements serve as a key element required for the applicability of their 
methodology in other geographic contexts. Specifically, Albuquerque notes that countries such as 
Colombia have laws that encourage the reconciliation of land conflicts, and make it possible for 
financial institutions to create credit lines for land regularization in areas of social interest.169 Terra 
Nova believes that, with some adaptations in the regulatory frameworks of this sector, this model 
could be expanded to Colombia and other countries in Latin America.  
Furthermore, André cites that the international recognitions the company has received 
indicate its transferability to other countries. For example, in 2005, Terra Nova received the Rene 
Frank Habitat Award in Cannes, France, as recognized by the International Real Estate Federation 
(FIABCI), due to their partnership with COHAPAR.170 This recognition from an international real 
estate network indicates a widespread interest in slum upgrading policies. The presence of these 
policies will facilitate the transferability of my argument in that if governments maintain a similar 
goal of social enterprises in regard to slum regularization and upgrading, there exists a greater 
foundation for relationships rooted in collaborative interdependence. 
 
169 A. Albuquerque, “Social Regularizer,” 26 
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However, many countries still maintain a policy of slum eradication and do not allocate 
public resources to improving existing informal settlements. The reason these governments pursue 
eradication often involves selling the land to generate private investment. Goals regarding private 
investment stem from an economic incentive that excludes social priorities, such as poverty 
alleviation for slum residents.  
Theoretically, an approach of collaborative interdependence from a social enterprise could 
help align a government’s economic goals with the social needs of residents; however, in practice, 
through legislation and policy implementation, governments exercise primary control over 
residents and businesses seeking to operate in the country. Taking these power dynamics into 
consideration, collaborative interdependence proves more difficult to establish when the 
government has not demonstrated an interest in slum upgrading.  
In contextualizing this idea, I turn to Ethiopia, an urbanizing country that exhibits 
inconsistent policies to address informal settlements that range from a laissez‐faire approach that 
offers ownership and upgrades to some informal settlements, to a forcible slum‐clearing approach 
for others.171 For example, the government has been clearing slums from publicly owned but 
informally-built land settlements, specifically near the capital, Addis Ababa, to allow for the 
development of modern condominium apartments.172 In situations like this, the upfront investment 
provided by private developers likely outcompetes any revenues that could be generated by a 
commercial solution led by a social enterprise, such as Terra Nova, who relies on phased payments 
from residents that generate returns in the long-term. 
 
171Parby, Jonas, Nancy Lozano Gracia, David Mason, Somik V. Lall, Basab Dasgupta, and Cheryl Young. 2015. 
“Stocktaking of the Housing Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Opportunities (Vol. 2): Main Report.” 
31. World Bank. World Bank. January 1, 2015.  
172Ibid.  
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The Ethiopia example shows how government opposition to slum upgrading can relate to 
competition from the private sector, where the government prioritizes economic returns over social 
revitalization of these areas. As illustrated by the findings from the PEF, financial capital 
constrains the expansion of social enterprises in the housing sector due to the high upfront costs. 
In areas where slum upgrading is not a government priority, social enterprises may face further 
barriers to expansion with an inability to compete with private developers. 
However, taking an inverse view of these findings, I argue governments that promote slum 
upgrading policies are likely to be receptive to social enterprises seeking to enter this arena, even 
if these governments lack bureaucratic capacity. As previously discussed, Colombia serves as an 
example of a government with policies geared towards slum upgrading, so this represents an 
environment where a social enterprise could likely benefit slum regularization systems by helping 
coordinate the implementation of these policies and the partners responsible for enacting these 
policies.  
Another example includes Angola, who in 2008 initiated its “one million houses program,” 
where 68 percent of the houses were slated to be built under self‐help initiatives. According to this 
plan, the government was to provide families with serviced and legalized land.173 The World Bank 
cites this program’s output as “sluggish” because the government is having difficulties in providing 
secure land to the many residents that do not even qualify for a subsidized mortgage.174 Here, a 
social enterprise could offer benefits in partnering with governments to improve the “sluggish” 
nature of the project, say, by providing micro crediting programs for residents with the help of an 
impact investor to help overcome the payment issues faced by governments. I use this hypothetical 





the government, residents, and impact investors to overcome some of the issues faced by the 
Angolan government, while taking advantage of the government’s willingness to pursue slum 
upgrading policies. 
 These brief examples illustrate the transferability of my argument to other geographical 
contexts. They also demonstrate that government support for slum upgrading policies as an 
important factor for social enterprise’s potential involvement in these regularization systems. Next 
I will discuss the transferability of my argument to the social enterprises’ ability to build 
collaborative, long-standing relationships with residents of informal settlements, which I refer to 
as the BoP. 
 
Relationship Building with Residents 
I originally argued that Terra Nova’s identity as a social enterprise incentivizes 
relationships with the BoP that help them to overcome barriers in navigating the legal property 
system. In gauging the applicability of this argument to social enterprises more broadly, it becomes 
important to consider how Terra Nova’s specialty as a legal service provider comes into play. More 
specifically, the technical legal experience provided by Terra Nova helps explain the specialization 
in negotiation and mediation between partners and the assistance the company can provide for 
residents in navigating the bureaucratic system. The question arises: can social enterprises 
participate in ways other than a legal negotiator and coordinator to help manage partnerships, 
particularly with residents, in the land regularization process?  
We can further explore this question through the lens of another social enterprise: Ansaar 
Management Company (AMC). AMC is a social enterprise located in Pakistan that operates as a 
developer to identify large tracts of land in the peri-urban areas of major cities of Pakistan to 
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develop affordable housing for members of the BoP.175 In Pakistan, 41 percent of the urban 
population lives within informal settlements, and urban populations continue to  grow, nearly 
doubling from 43 million to 75 million between 1998 and 2017.176 The country also holds over 
one third of South Asia’s urban population, and Pakistan’s urban centers have faced similar issues 
to Brazil with the accumulation of peripheral informal settlements. The development of AMC 
shows an example of how social enterprises can operate in different geographic contexts, as well 
as within specialties other than legal mediation and negotiation.  
As a developer, AMC speaks to risks mentioned by Daniel Albuquerque in Chapter 3, 
where the potential arises for a private company to develop and sell land to those of lower income, 
then evict them if they cannot make the payments. While this risk may still apply for a traditional 
for-profit company, as a social enterprise, AMC takes a different approach. AMC generates profit 
by selling 70 percent of its units at or near cost for low income residents, while selling the 
remaining 30 percent at a market rate.177 AMC coordinates the development of new housing units 
that come with legal tenure for residents and include services like running water, sanitation, 
electricity, sewage, etc.178 AMC also ensures that all civil works contractors hire laborers from 
within the local community whenever possible.179 Here, AMC offers a different form of 
coordination from Terra Nova. Instead of serving as a legal negotiator, the company brings 
expertise in infrastructure development. Their methods also differ in building new housing for the 
BoP instead of upgrading existing housing.  
 
175 Ansaar Management Company. n.d. “AMC | Affordable Housing for All.” AMC | Affordable Housing for All. 
Ansaar Management Company. Accessed April 20, 2021. https://amcpakistan.org/. 
176 UN Habitat. 2021. “Pakistan | UN-Habitat.” UN-Habitat - A Better Urban Future | UN-Habitat. United Nations. 
2021. https://unhabitat.org/pakistan. 
177Ansaar Management Company, “AMC | Affordable Housing for All.” Accessed April 20, 2021. 
https://amcpakistan.org/. 
178 Ibid.  
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However, AMC displays similar characteristics to Terra Nova in their ability to build 
relationships with residents. For example, by ensuring that civil contractors hire laborers from 
within the community, such as masons, electricians, plumbers, builders, etc. AMC works to 
involve the community in the process and provide additional economic opportunities for these 
residents. Due to their focus on both social impacts and economic returns, AMC is concerned with 
involving residents in the process in ways that typically would not occur for a traditional for-profit 
enterprise focused solely on profit. We can compare this to Terra Nova’s efforts to facilitate 
demand creation by holding community workshops to teach residents about construction and 
property management. 
The AMC example shows how social enterprises operate in similar ways to Terra Nova, in 
helping to provide land ownership and services to low income residents, without operating as a 
legal service provider. Lastly, AMC demonstrates collaborative interdependence by forging 
relationships with lending institutions to ensure affordable prices for residents and designing all 
homes in cooperation with community members to ensure their needs are met.  
I considered the AMC case because the company illustrates how even a developer can serve 
as a social enterprise in building relationships with residents that cannot be satisfied by traditional 
companies or governments. Furthermore, AMC works to secure land titles for residents, thereby 
showing how social enterprises can help residents overcome barriers to the formal property system. 
However, while collaborative interdependence can still be employed by AMC in managing their 
partnerships with residents, designers, service contractors, and NGOs, the theory is less applicable 
in an environment without the kinds of conflicts faced in cases of regularizing existing slums. This 
lack of conflict speaks to a potential qualifier for my argument. I posit that social enterprises can 
present more value to regularization systems where either conflict remains over the property 
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ownership, and/or specifically in cases of slum upgrading over developing new housing.  These 
upgrading projects involve a greater volume of interdependent interests that can be managed by a 
social enterprise. 
 
Relationships with Impact Investors 
The AMC example also helps illustrate my argument about social enterprises’ relationships 
with impact investors through their partnership with the Acumen Fund. Acumen Fund is an 
organization that focuses on supporting companies that tackle issues related to poverty, and lack 
of basic goods and services. Acumen’s vision states: “Rather than giving philanthropy away, we 
invest it in companies and change makers.”180 Acumen serves as another example of an “impact 
investor,” like MOV, that provides “patient capital,” or financial support that does not depend on 
short-term returns, but rather contributes to long-term projects that help change lives for the BoP. 
In applying this discussion of impact investors more broadly, I will briefly highlight the 
growth of impact investors and their levels of activity in the housing sector. According to the 
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, between 2014 and 2016 sustainable investing has grown 
to hold a significant share of the market in Europe and Australia, accounting for approximately 50 
percent of their managed assets.181 The U.S. and Canada experienced similar rates of growth,  
where its share of the market ranges from 22 to 38 percent.182 Furthermore, the Global Impact 
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Investment Network predicts that the global impact investing sector has doubled in the past two 
years.183  
The rapid growth of this sector indicates its future potential. Particularly with the rise of 
Millennial and Gen Z investors, researchers expect an increase in impact investing, or more so 
making Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) considerations commonplace in investment 
transactions. Furthermore, by 2025, millennials are expected to make up about 75% of the 
American workforce,184 and by 2030, they will hold five times as much wealth as they have today 
and are expected to inherit over $68 trillion from Baby Boomers over the next 30 years in what’s 
been called “The Great Wealth Transfer.”185 Those numbers indicate the potential for exponential 
growth in the impact investing sector over the next decade. 
However, since this growth has occurred so recently, there is limited data to provide a 
global perspective of impact investing. Most reports cite data from firms located in the U.S., 
Canada, and Europe. With the limited data available, it appears as though investing firms primarily 
locate themselves in these Western countries. This concentration of investment firms in Western 
countries carries two major implications, one being their likelihood to apply investments within 
their same region, and the second being physical barriers involved with investing in ventures in 
other global regions.  
These factors should be considered in this discussion of the broader applicability of my 
argument, particularly because Terra Nova’s relationship with MOV involves a company and 
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investor both located in Brazil. Based on the data available, arrangements like these prove less 
common, so it becomes important to consider how these cross-regional locations could affect the 
investor-enterprise relationships. Specifically considering informal settlements, these 
communities largely arise in developing countries including Latin America, Africa, and Southeast 
Asia.186 Therefore, impact investors looking to invest in housing initiatives related to informal 
settlements will more likely do with some degree of physical and cultural separation if they are 
located in a Western country.  
MOV’s partnership with Terra Nova is particularly strong because of their contributions of 
financial, human, and knowledge capital. An investor can arguably provide these forms of capital 
more easily within a closer physical proximity and with knowledge of the local context. For 
example, being located in Brazil likely made the contribution of a team member to the Terra Nova 
board more feasible. Furthermore, MOV executives had the opportunity to make several visits to 
Terra Nova’s projects to truly understand their value proposition.187 
While the primary discussion of impact investors in my argument discussed financial 
capital, impact investors most importantly should provide “patient capital,” or a long-term 
investment. Approaching the issue of informal settlements from a Western perspective means 
addressing a problem coming from a country where the issue largely does not exist. This lack of 
exposure to the issue could affect their ability to provide “patient capital” by contributing to a 
different understanding of the social goals and a difficulty in aligning the methods and mechanisms 
to achieve these goals. These are core tenets of collaborative interdependence, so in other words I 
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am postulating that collaborative interdependence may be more difficult to apply between social 
enterprises and impact investors in the housing sector due to physical and cultural distance. 
Furthermore, this physical and cultural distance has begun to lead these investors to 
concentrate in the areas in which they operate. The Global Impact Investing Network’s (GIIN) 
recent report on housing investment shows an increasing involvement of impact investors in this 
field. The report used a sample of 10 impact investing groups collectively managing $4 billion in 
investment assets. 96% of those who received the investments were located in the United States, 
with the remaining 4% based in each of Canada, the UK, Kenya, and Mexico.188 Here we see a 
major authority on impact investing provide a sample overview of their activity in the housing 
sector, and the results indicate a lack of investment in areas where informal settlements are most 
prominent, and an overall lack of focus on the issue.  
However, the report also finds that together, nine of the investors in the study helped 
facilitate access to affordable housing for an estimated 37,000 individuals through 116 
investments. Additionally, the report notes that “the median investment provided affordable, safe, 
and quality housing for 197 individuals over a one-year period, or approximately 15 individuals 
per USD 100,000 invested. This represents 0.1% of the total number of cost-burdened individuals 
in the state or province of investment.”189 While these results do not represent gains for those in 
informal settlements, they show the potential and interest of impact investors in becoming involved 
in the housing sector.  
There are firms not included in GIIN’s sample that address informal settlements, like 
Acumen Fund and the Omidyar Network, and overall more investment firms are continuing to 
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expand their portfolios to include BoP housing initiatives. Ideally, informal settlements will see a 
rise of interested impact investors, as well as social enterprises through which these investors can 
channel their capital. However, it remains important to consider the predominantly Western 
perspective of these investors in considering their strategy for making social impacts in housing, 
and in forming collaborative partnerships with BoP-oriented social enterprises.      
 
5. 4 Implications and Limitations of the Partnership Ecosystem Framework (PEF) 
The Partnership Ecosystem Framework is intended for use by enterprises to evaluate their 
partnership ecosystem and make strategic decisions as to where the company could use more 
partnership support. I took a different approach, where I used the framework to show how the 
enterprise is incentivized to create partnerships by different enterprise specific activities, i.e. 
facilitating market transactions, accessing financial capital, etc. In this section I plan to explore the 
limitations to my application of the framework, particularly in relation to London’s original use, 
while tying together findings from both approaches to apply to a broader context outside of the 
Terra Nova case study.  
London’s approach seeks to categorize an enterprise’s partnerships to help evaluate the 
volume and strength of these partnerships. My approach did not prioritize volume and strength 
necessarily, and rather focused on the grounds of formation for the partnership. My approach is 
limited in that the existence of a partnership does not necessarily indicate the functionality of the 
partnership or whether there could be more strategically relevant choices for the enterprise. 
However, I continued with the approach because my argument stresses the importance of forming 
partnerships in the regularization system that did not exist before, leading to a more binary 
approach looking at whether a partnership has or has not been formed. Again, this differs from 
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London’s more strategic approach that seeks to generate recommendations for the enterprise in 
enhancing their partnership ecosystem.  
In taking a more critical look at the quality of Terra Nova’s partnerships, some 
considerations arise that speak to potential considerations or pitfalls for other enterprises in 
entering informal settlement regularization processes. I plan to frame this discussion by identifying 
specific activities outlined in the framework that I believe warrant further discussion, particularly 
in applying London’s original approach. 
 
Market Access 
 My discussion on Market Access emphasized how the formation of partnerships with 
governments is encouraged by the company’s need for implementation support. While the 
formation of partnerships with governments is incentivized by this need, this incentive does not 
automatically translate into a well-functioning partnership. While Terra Nova offers a great value 
to governments in helping settle disputes and avoiding millions of dollars in costs to remove 
residents, there exist obstacles that weaken Terra Nova’s relationship with governments that could 
similarly affect other enterprises. These obstacles mainly involve relationships with local 
politicians and political administrations as a whole. Terra Nova shows how managing political 
relationships will prove particularly important for enterprises pursuing market access in the 
housing sector.  
Beginning with administrations headed by a political party, these term lengths often span 
a shorter time than the time required by Tera Nova’s services. In other words, one politician or 
political party may agree and cooperate with Terra Nova, yet if a new politician or party becomes 
elected during the process, there stands a risk of discontinuity by public agencies. A difference in 
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ideology can lead to the discontinuity of the project, say, between a more neoliberal administration 
that seeks greater involvement with and reliance on the private sector and a more socialized model 
where the administration seeks to expand the capacity of the government to provide public services 
instead of relying on private entities.  
 Terra Nova faced this exact issue in its first attempt at a large-scale agreement for a 
community in Pinhais, Paraná in 2001. In this case, landowners and resident associations agreed 
on prices and were ready to sign the regularization agreement; however, the election of a new 
mayor led to the discontinuation of the project. André Albuquerque commented to Harvard 
researchers stating: “It did not matter if the project was good or bad. It had been set up by a different 
political group, so the new administration decided to discontinue it.”190 
The company also faced similar issues with local political leaders. For example, in 2007 
the company was requested to mediate negotiations in a 6,000-member community in São Paulo 
known as Pinheirinho. Terra Nova pursued “market access” activities by setting up a meeting with 
the community to present its methodology. However, André states that their “work was 
undermined by a local leader linked to a political party, who claimed the state should guarantee 
people’s right to housing.”191 As a result, the agreement never came to fruition, and four years 
later, all residents were evicted in a violent police operation. 
These examples help illustrate that even though Terra Nova follows its incentives as a 
social enterprise to build relationships with local leaders and government officials to achieve 
market access, political conflicts may arise in these partnerships that threaten their strength and 
functionality. These findings also tie back to the previous discussion regarding collaborative 
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interdependence and the importance of working with governments that similarly prioritize slum 
upgrading. This discussion contributes an important caveat to that point, where if there are policies 
meant for slum upgrading, political leaders may be less inclined to work with a social enterprise if 
their administration believes that slum upgrading should be handled solely by the government. 
From this finding we can conclude that addressing different political ideologies regarding private 
intervention in land regularization will prove particularly important for enterprises pursuing 
market access in the housing sector.  
 
Institutional Infrastructure  
Another major takeaway we can generate from the framework by combining my approach 
with London’s approach involves institutional infrastructure, and particularly the availability of 
property mapping and data. From my approach, one can view Terra Nova’s partnership with GLA 
as a benefit to the land regularization process by involving a partner that can address the issue. 
From London’s approach, we can glean the importance of finding a strong partner in this area, 
otherwise the enterprise may face limitations in expanding. In applying these conclusions more 
broadly, one can assume that areas lacking in mapping software could benefit from the 
involvement of a social enterprise who may incentivize the adoption of this technology. 
Conversely, areas lacking mapping software pose significant barriers for a social enterprise that 
will likely require a partnership to address. 
There exist few global examples of countries that maintain a complete, condensed, and 
accurate source of housing information, maps, and other data, particularly regarding informal 
settlements. Informal settlements by nature lack registration with formal property systems; 
however, states still maintain the responsibility of mapping and gathering data for these areas to 
140 
help account for the population residing there. With these two considerations in mind, we can 
conclude that investing in this institutional infrastructure to support housing data will be necessary 
for a social enterprise looking to operate in the housing sector. I propose taking this idea one step 
further to argue that partnerships with providers of geospatial mapping technology, like PlaceFund, 
can offer value to governments who have failed to provide such services themselves. Offering 
value in this way leads to a foundation of collaborative interdependence that can potentially help 




A final observation I will make from London’s approach involves an issue that still affects 
Terra Nova, being the need for greater financial support. According to an entry made by André 
Albuquerque to the Schwab Foundation Changemakers Network website, Terra Nova currently 
seeks “partnerships with financial institutions to 1) create “housing microcredit” programs or 2) 
securitize [their] receivables portfolio to attract investors seeking financial and social returns.”192 
Here, we see a connection to the PEF where financial support exists, with impact investors like 
MOV, but still could be stronger to support the company’s expansion and ability to create positive 
social and economic impacts. 
Originally, I used the PEF to argue that as a social enterprise, Terra Nova is incentivized 
to create partnerships that generate financial capital from impact investors. I tied this to a claim 
from Chapter 3 regarding how partnerships with impact investors are rooted in collaborative 
interdependence and thereby apply “patient capital” to the issue of informal settlements. However, 
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London’s approach adds to the story by indicating that the unmet need for financial support will 
continue to constrain Terra Nova’s expansion and could likely carry the same result in other 
contexts outside of the Terra Nova case study. 
 These financial constraints mainly arise from the high upfront costs to participating in the 
housing sector. Property in itself is a physically large and expensive asset, and it corresponds to 
large costs. Terra Nova’s upfront costs mainly arise in contracting companies to conduct socio 
economic surveys, environmental and topographic mapping assessments, and overall taking the 
time and energy to ensure the viability of the project. For AMC, the upfront costs arise when 
purchasing land to develop affordable housing. Construction and building processes also accrue 
large costs in the form of labor, expertise, and raw materials. Especially when working with large 
communities, these costs become multiplied across households. Meanwhile, to make these services 
affordable, Terra Nova and other enterprises must consider micro-financing plans. This leads to 
returns in the long run, but the company has already spent time and money in the beginning stages 
that can result in a capital miss-match. Terra Nova faces this issue in its efforts to expand to new 
communities, and likely other social enterprises will encounter similar capital miss-match issues 
in operating within the housing sector.  
 
5.5 Areas for Future Research 
 With greater time I would like to explore the contrast between social enterprises and 
government-controlled firms. Brazil is home to several that operate within the housing sector, 
though I chose not to study most of them because they operated in states that Terra Nova did not. 
The discussion about Terra Nova’s partnership with COHAPAR speaks to these points of inquiry; 
however, I would have liked to undertake a more thorough comparison between state-controlled 
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firms and social enterprises. For the sake of simplicity, Chapter 3 focused on government, non-
profits, and traditional for-profit companies, where state-controlled firms serve as a hybrid that 
could have warranted greater discussion. 
 Furthermore, I largely relied on Terra Nova’s overall success in generating social impacts 
as a part of my argument, where I claim that the company serves as an ideal case study showing 
how social enterprises should be integrated into property regularization systems. For future 
research I would like to take a more critical approach, namely by using the PEF the way London 
intended: as a strategic tool for evaluating where the enterprise could improve their partnership 
ecosystem. I commented on some of the broad takeaways from this approach; however, applying 
London’s approach more consistently would likely lead to the generation of recommendations for 
partnerships that could improve Terra Nova’s ability to achieve success and scale. These 
recommendations could then potentially be transferred into broad considerations for social 
enterprises looking to enter and form partnerships within informal settlement regularization 
systems. 
 Lastly, much of my discussion focused on the BoP, meaning the subset of the population 
earning less than $3,000 per capita per year. The BoP context becomes important particularly for 
identifying features of the underdeveloped market environment in which these enterprises operate. 
However, most of Terra Nova’s customer base lives slightly above the means of the “absolute” 
BoP, so using this umbrella term can erase important caveats that affect the application of my 
argument on a larger scale.  
 A major caveat involves the purchasing power of the BoP. Daniel Albuquerque admits that 
the company primarily serves residents of Brazil’s socioeconomic classes C and D, while residents 
of class E, who could be considered members of the absolute base of the pyramid, typically cannot 
143 
afford Terra Nova’s services. This point indicates that in expanding my argument to other contexts, 
enterprises may find it difficult to serve the most low-income populations due to financial 
constraints. With future research I would like to explore how addressing informal settlements from 
a property-rights perspective can lead to exclusion of the most vulnerable populations due to the 
high upfront costs involved in the housing sector.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 As global trends of increasing urbanization continue, we can expect a growing prevalence 
of informal settlements, leading to more and more residents living in a precarious legal situation 
without access to critical public services. Over one billion people continue to live in slums, so 
finding innovative, efficient solutions remains an important goal that I argue social enterprises can 
help achieve through their ability to manage cross-sectoral partnerships. Brazil serves as an 
example of an urbanizing country faced with a housing deficit, yet they exhibit policies aimed 
toward slum upgrading that have effectively paved the way for social enterprise Terra Nova to 
emerge.  
Terra Nova has demonstrated success in coordinating large-scale slum regularization 
agreements for over 20 years, issuing over 55,000 land titles and coordinating the provision of 
public services for over thirty communities across Brazil. The benefits that regularization has to 
offer extend beyond property title to areas of health, psychological well-being, employment, 
mobility, education, wealth, and social inclusion into urban society. Many issues faced by the BoP 
can be traced back to their living environment, so interventions from enterprises like Terra Nova 
can generate sector-spanning effects that lead to a complete community transformation. 
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 Throughout this research I have argued that Terra Nova serves as a case study for 
understanding how social enterprises manage a complex ecosystem of partners using collaborative 
interdependence, and that their identity as a social enterprise incentivizes the formation of these 
partnerships in regularization systems that did not exist before. Due to the cross-sectoral nature of 
the issue, there exists a wide variety of stakeholders and partners that require coordination, and 
Terra Nova shows how social enterprises are incentivized to undertake this coordination. 
 Specifically, I used the Partnership Ecosystem Framework to map Terra Nova’s partners 
and discuss the grounds of partnership formation, as well as the interplay between different 
partners. The interplay between partners relates to the discussion of collaborative interdependence, 
which emphasizes mutual value creation between partners by approaching these relationships with 
the mindset: “how can we help each other?”  
Major findings from these discussions include the contribution of collaborative 
interdependence to relationships with and between governments, the BoP, and impact investors. 
In discussing the applicability of these findings more broadly, I identified factors that can 
contribute to and or limit the success of other enterprises seeking to participate in the informal 
housing sector. These factors include the importance of government support for slum upgrading 
policies, as well as the need to manage relationships with political parties to reduce resistance 
towards private intervention. Furthermore, I identified that social enterprises can potentially 
provide the most value in areas of conflict and ground-up rehabilitation of land, as these instances 
require greater collaboration between a wider range of partners. 
From the PEF I identified the importance of partnerships and investments in property 
mapping technology to enhance the market environment of the informal housing sector while 
presenting a value proposition to build relationships with governments. Furthermore, I outlined 
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the capital miss-match issue in the housing sector, which involves high amounts of upfront 
investments met with incremental returns in the long run. This capital miss-match can be addressed 
with “financial capital” partnerships that typically involve impact investors; however, Terra Nova 
demonstrates that even with an impact investor, financial capital will likely continue to constrain 
the enterprise, and this finding will likely hold true for other enterprises seeking to enter the field. 
Overall, the findings from the Terra Nova case study support my argument that social 
enterprises’ incentives and ability to manage a diverse partnership ecosystem can benefit informal 
settlement regularization processes through greater efficiency and aggregation of value for all 
partners and stakeholders. While there exist caveats for expanding this argument to other social 
enterprises and geographical contexts, I hope this research encourages both the emergence of 
social enterprises in the informal housing sector, as well as support from governments in 
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